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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 20, 1959, Senator John Kennedy (Dem. Mass.) introduced in the 
Senate ot the United States on behalf ot Senator Sam Ervin (Dem. N.C.) and 
himselt a bill providing tor "the reporting and disclosure of certain finan-
cial transactions and administrative ~ractices of labor organizations and em-
ployers, to prevent abuses in the administration of trusteeships by labor or-
ganizations, to provide standards with respect to the election of officers of 
labor organizations, and tor other purposes. ltl The purpose of this paper is 
to follow that bill through the multiple stages of the legislative process and 
to examine along the way what happened to it, how the happenings occu1"1"ed, and 
to the extent we are able, why they happened. 1'1e will attempt to describe and 
evaluate strategies, tactics, and parliamentary maneuvers affecting the pro-
gress of the bill, and examine some background events which, although occur-
ring outside t.he immediate realm of t.he Congress, aftected the outcome of the 
legislative consideration. 
The bill that emerged as law from the first session ot the Eighty-5ixth 
Congress was not the labor reform bill originally known as the Kennedy-Ervin 
bill (3.1555), but a law quite different in substance and effect. The account 
of what happened to the Kennedy-Ervin bUl, however, explains how this final 
lU.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Tuesday, January 20, 1959, Vol. 105 (Washington, 1959), p. 80). 
2 
labor reform act was achieved. The story officially ends on September 14, 
1959, with President Eisenhower's signature on Public Law 86-257, 8.1555, but 
the actual conclusion of the legislative power 8trug~le between the proponents 
of Kennedy-Ervin bill labor reform and proponents of Landrum-Gritfin bUl type 
reform took place somewhat earlier. This thesi. will attempt to present the 
complete story, as chronologically as clear presentation permits. 
This story of labor reform legislation in the first session of the Eighty 
Sixth Congress is both interesting and import.ant, and it is hoped that this 
presentation of it does justice to both elements. The interest lies in the 
widespread and heated participation of political, business, and labor groups 
and interests contending on the issue. The import.ance is found in the present 
and possible tuture eftects ot what was done, and what was not done for that 
matter, tor the failure of the Kennedy'-Errln provisions tor labor reform repre 
sents the rejection ot its proposed position for the Federal Government in 
labor-management aftairs. 
Primary reliance tor the material used in the paper was placed on origi-
nal sources such as the Congre,sional Record, and committee hearings and re-
ports, but valuable supplementary material and background facts and opinions 
were obtained from the coverage of the subjeot by the daily press and other 
periodicals. 
In Chapters III and IV on the progress ot the bill in the Senate and 
House the bulk of the factual information was derived from the Coggressional 
Record. Footnote references to the Record have been made only when deemed 
necessary to clarify a fact or opinion not obviously derived from the context 
of the debate. 
CHAPTF..R II 
THE PRELDHNARIES 
The first serious attempt to obtain labor reform legislation since pas-
sage of the Taft-HartleY' Act originated in the hands of Senator Kennedy' and 
occurred in the second session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress in 1955. This 
earlier attempt by Kennedy' was co-sponsored bY' the then Republican senator 
from New York state, Irving Ives. A relativelY' mild measure as a labor reform 
proposal, the Kennedy'-Ives bill was endorsed by the AFL-GIO and opposed bY' 
emploY'er groups who objected to it on the grounds that the bill contained no 
restrictions on union secondary boy-eott practices and compulsory un; )nism, and 
that it imposed reporting requirements on emplo;yers for expenditures on labor 
relations.l 
The Kennegy-Ives~. When the bill passed the Senate bY' a vote of 
eighty-eight to one, prospects for its enactment appeared favorable, but 
Representative Graham Barden (Dam. N.C.), Chairman of the House Committee on 
Educa.tion and Labor, made it very clear when the bill was referred to his 
committee that he expected it to die there.2 The most obvious rea.son tor 
Barden's attitude, considering that he was an advocate of strict labor reform 
lQ.!!. News .!!lS. l'iorld Repon. XLV (August S, 1958) I 79. 
2Ibid• 
and that he possessed consirlerable power as committee ohairman to influence 
such legislation, seems to be that 1958 was an election year for Congress and 
therefore not a propitious time to introduce B serious oontroversy which 
neither major political party really wanted. It is also possible he realized 
that only by amending the Taft-Hartley Act could real reform be achieved, a 
course certain to precipitate a fierce battle which would probably result in 
a stalemate and failure to achieve any legislation. 
4 
Senator Barry Goldwater (Rep. Ariz.), long a proponent of positions also 
held by management groups, accused Speaker of the House Sam Raybum (Dem. Tex.) 
of obstructing the bill for fear the House Committee would make it more effec-
tive. But in an exchange with Senator Kennedy early in the 1959 congressional 
session, Goldwater was more candid. "Let's admit there was a lot of politics 
in the labor bill last year," he said. "You played politics and we nlayed 
politics, what the hell, it was an election year. ,t3 Rayburn, however, con-
tended that the only reason for the failure of the House to act on the bill in 
time for passage was the urgency ot other legislati.:"fl then under consideration 
which would have been sidetracked in a labor bill dispute. He mentioned wel-
fare bills especially in this connection. 
Neither party was strongly in favor ot a labor bill in 1958, and the 
issue would certainly not have arisen at all had it not been for the release 
in March, 1958, ot the first interim report ot the McClellan Senate P~ckets 
Committee which stimulated public recognition, at least temporarily, of the 
need fer labor legislation. Both major parties had plaus:tble argtunents plac-
ing the blame on the other for failure to enact any bill in 1958. The 
3Newaweek LIII (Februar,y 9, 1959), 30. 
Republicans claL~ed that the ~mole matter was the responsibility of the 
Demoerat-controlled Congress, and the Democrats pointed out that the bill was 
actually killed by Republican votes whnn it fin-':llly reached the floor of the 
House. The vote against the bill on August 18, 1958, was 198 to 190, the 
majority comprised mainly of Republicans and southern Democrats who opposed 
the bill because they were not allowed time under the rules to amend and 
stiffen the bill's reform provisions.4 The AFL-CIO was enthusi~stic enough 
about the bill to issue an eleventh-hour appeal for passage,S but the bill 
died at the hands of those who intenoed to find a stronger successor to it. 
Failure of the Kennedy-Ives bill under the above circumstances certainly 
; 
added strength to the determination of the opposing factions to obt'dn a labor 
bill to their likine in the foll~iing session of Congress. 
To understand the history of the subsequent Kennedy-Ervin bill, it is im-
portant to examine the reasons for the need felt by Congre5s to enact a labor 
bill, and what reforms were being advocated and opposed. The most clear and 
complete explanation is found in the voluminous record of the hearings of the 
HcClellan Senate Rackets Committee, officially known as the Senate Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management. This committee, 
under its chairman, Senator John McClellan (Oem. Ark.), who was assisted 
by Senator Kennedy's brother, Committee Special Counsel Robert Kennedy, con-
ducted well-publicized hearings, many of them televised, for two and one-half 
years (1957-1959) and produced so many allegations of misconduct in labor-
4Ibid., p. 30. 
%-ime, LII (September 1, 1955), 16. 
management relations that public shock was deep and general.6 Even George 
6 
Meany, President of the AFL-CrO, admitted that he had not imagined the 
situation was so bad. 
!!!! .-M:.::,cC;:;;l:;,;e:;,::l:,;:l:,;;:an:.:. Committee. The ~,1cClellan Comrrd.ttee heard 1526 witnesses 
in two hundred seventy hearings and published 46,150 pages of testimony. Two 
interir!l reports of its findings were issued" one in ~1arch 195e just prior to 
consideration of the Kennedy-lves bill, and the second in August 1959, in the 
height and heat of the Kenne~v-Ervin versus Landrum-Griffin legislative battle. 
These reports detailed the many incidents of corrnptton, violence, and racket-
eering which ~ere discovered in labor-management relations and presented in 
testi~ony before the canmittee. Most of the material concerned misconduct b,y 
officials of labor unions, especially the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, though the use of union-busting "labor relations consultants" by 
management personnel was also highlighted. The material in these COlmni ttee 
reports furnished the nation's newspapers with headline scandals for many 
months, but the strongest impressions in the public mind were probably the 
result of the tele'\rised hearings which featured the appear&nee of well-known 
underworld figures. The typical appearance of these individua.ls, known to 
the police as "syndicate hoodlums," involved a recital by Special Counsel 
KenneQy of tho police record and general background of these persons and then 
an examination of their union affiliation, usually as local union officials. 
Kenneqy and members of the committee would then question the witnesses about 
alleged criminal actions or unethical practices in labor-management matters, 
questions which brought OUtraged denials from the witnesses or, most often, a 
~ewsweek, LXV (September 21, 1959), 62. 
7 
monotonous repetition of the claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States against self-incrimination. 
The most sensational testimony came in regard to the handling of union 
funds, especially pension and welfare money. The committee probed deeply into 
irregula.rities discovered in various Teamster locals, and demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of the Dublic that many Teamster officials, including the Inter-
natlon!.:<.1.'s president, Dave Beck, had helped themselves generously from the 
union treasury. The irregularities discovered in Teamster union activities 
resulted in appointment of Itmonitors" by a Federal District court to direct 
reform of this the nation t s largest and most powerful union. 
The focus on union racketeering provided by the McClellan hearings and 
reports served to inform the public, the press, management, union members, and 
the Congress of the urgent need for better labor legislation. The operations 
of this committee continued as a background accompaniment to the legislative 
deliberations over labor reform, and occasionally became the main theme. 
The deep and lasting impact caused by the Rackets Committee revelations 
must be kept in mind in the examination of the congressional activities on 
the Kennedy-Ervin bill, as a new Federal Government position vis-a-vis regu-
lation of labor-management affairs is developed. 
One other background happening is of sufficient importance to be kept in 
mind while trying to understand the legislative history of the Kennedy-Ervin 
bill, and that is the long and bitter contract negotiating struggle between 
the major steel companies and the United Steel Workers union. Negotiations 
and propaganda by both sides continued throughout the 1959 congressional 
session, and became the most important daily news as the strike date of July 1, 
1959 approached. This crisis in the steel industr;,r, the nation's most impor-
• .11 
~ ·0· ., 
high wages and large profits, greatly disturbed the public mind and added a 
distinctly anxious and troubled urgency to the whole consideration of labor 
legislation. 
8 
Politics. Although 1959 was not an election year, the question of poli-
tics was deeply involved in the labor bill question. Two of the leading 
figures in the story were staking political futures in taking positions during 
the encounter. Senator Kennedy's thinly-veiled ambitions for the 1960 Demo-
cratic presidential nomination depended for continuing life on his success in 
achieving a meaningful labor-reform bill which would not antagonize either 
labor or management unduly. A bill bearing his name would provide him with 
valuable prestige and publicity, but it would have to be a bill which would 
associate his name happily in the general public eye. Political observers 
were a little surprised to see Kennedy commit himself so early on such a con-
troversial question. Kenned7's objective must surely have been to attain 
stature, rather than to concentrate on holding a position which was insuffi-
cient to bring him the Democratic nomination in I?60. 
The other leading figure with political stakes in the labor bill delibera-
tions was Senator Lyndon Johnson (Dem. Tex.), Senate Majority Leader. Placed 
in the difficult position of responsibility for the entire Democratic legis-
lative program, Johnson daily was forced to take positions for or against all 
legislation under consideration in the Senate. With the reputation of being 
a conservative Southerner and also being ambitious for the Democratic presi-
dential nomination in 1960, how was he to participate in the labor bill con -
troversy, the key bill of the entire session? And although Johnson and 
Kennedy were friends, Johnson was placed in the unpleasant position of 
minimizing Kennedy's prestige to safeguard his own chances politically. 
These circumstances, coinciding in the summer of 1959, produced what 9 
the twenty-two previous sessions of Congress, all of which considered labor 
legislation, had failed to accomplish since passage of the Taft-Hartley Bill 
in 1947: a major labor-management bill. The story of that accomplishment is 
the substance of the material which follows. 
\ 
\ 
CHAPTER III 
THE BILL IN THE SENATE 
After Senator Kennedy introduced the bill, at that time assigned the 
title S. 505, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
ifJelfsre where, in turn, it was passed on to the Subcommittee on Labor .. 
Kennedy was chainnan of the subcommittee; other members were Pat M'cNamara 
(Dem. Mich.), vJayne Morse (Dem. Ore.), Jennings Randolph (Dam. 1:1. Va.), 
Barry Goldwater (Rep. Ariz.), Everett Dirksen (Rep. ill.), and Winston 
Prouty (Rep. Vt.). The Kennedy subcommittee held hearings on the Kennedy-
Ervin bill and five other labor reform proposals, including an Administration 
bill" from January 2S, 1959 to l.farch 9, 1959, during which time it heard 
testimony from twenty-two witnesses. There were also statements for the 
record received trom a total of thirty-five persons representing nine labor 
organizations, twenty-one management groups, and several groups testifying 
in the public interest. 
Committee Hearinss. Witnesses who were given the most attention by the 
subcommittee were: Godfrey p .• Schmidt, New York attorney acting as one of 
three monitors under court order to regulate the affairs of the Teamsters; 
Professor Archibald Cox, Harvard Law School authority on labor legislation, 
who was also serving as a voluntary assistant to Senator Kennedy while the la-
bor bill was under consideration; Secretary of Labor James F. ?.f1tchell; 
Senator McClellan, and Andrew J. Bi~~ller, representing the AFL-CIO.l 11 
Secretary Nitchell's appearance produced the most interesting and note-
worthy situation of all. In 1958 l~itchell had opposed passage of the Kennedy-
Ives bill. Now, in 1959, Kennedy was agn.in pressine for a labor bill, and 
the Senator had carefully prepared for the Secretary's appearance. Fifteen 
minutes prior to the conclusion of Mitchell's statement before the sub-
committee in support of the ad.,"'linistration labor retorm bill, S. 748, Kenne-
dy's mimeographed reply, clearly marked for release "upon conclusion ot 
testimony," was being distributed in the subcommittee room.2 Beyond what 
may have been an unintentional discourtesy to Mitchell, this premature dis-
trlbution of a reply to testimony not yet presented demonstrated Kennedyls 
firm intention to negate and discredit the Secretary's remarks. 
When the Secretary had concluded his testimony, Kennedy began questioning 
some of the provisions of the Administration.bill. tlhen he claimed that the 
bill would punish honest locals by depriving them of National Labor Relations 
Board services as a result of the dishonesty of individual officials of the 
locals, neither Mitchell nor Stuart Rothman, Labor Department legal aide 
present to provide expert assistance and support for Mitchell's testimony, 
could find an answer to the charge and admitted that Kennedy might be correct. 
And when Kennedy quoted from the administration bill, Rothman demonstrated his 
unl'amiliarity with it in his difficulty in locating the passages. In the face 
lU. S. Congress, Senate, Labor4{anagement Reform Legislation Hearings 
before the Subcommlttee 2n Labor 2!~ Committee 2U Labor ~ Public~­
~, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
2Newsweek, LIlI (February 16, 1959), 25. 
12 
of this well-informed atta.ck, Hitchell was forced in embarrassment to ask for 
a recess Uto have another look" at the bill.3 The fact that Kennedy obviously 
knew the ,Administration bill considerably better than its spokesmen lett 
little hope it would triumph against the Kennedy-Ervin bill. 
The subcommittee modified the Kennedy-Ervin bill based on the testimony 
it had heard and the suggestions and recommendations it had received "to in-
elude those recommendations which strengthened the bill and increased its 
effectiveness,n4 but eventually reached a point beyond which it could not pro-
ceed. Sena.tors Dirksen and Goldwater pressed ha.rd for further amendments, but 
Kennedy suggested that the bill be forwarded to the full c~tte. for further 
consideration. Senator Morse made a motion to that effect, saying that furthe 
amenrunents should have the participation and concurrence of the full committee~ 
The adherents of the Kennedy bill had little to lose in this proposal; tempers 
were getting short and they (Ud not want to alienate the opposition, only to 
frustrate their efforts gradually and tactfully. Furthermore, in the f1111 
committee they also held a commanding majority by party, and an even stronger 
force in sympathy to the bill. other voices in opposition to the minority 
proposals were expected to soften the personal frictions in the smaller sub-
oommittee, and distribute any resentment that might be felt by the minority 
members who were £!ghting so hard for ohanges. Senator Goldwater evidently 
believed he could find further support in the full committee, for there is no 
evidence that he opposed the suggestion to forward the bill. He had little 
3Ibid• J p. 25. 
4Labor-ManagameE! Reporting ~ Disclosu~a Act 2!~ Senate RepOrt 
!2.. ~ B6th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. 
5Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 2430. 
choice in a::1Y 'JV''::;:' ::::In_E: the subcorrllrJ.t~~ee 1!:''1j()l-ity o!)posed further chanees 
t, 
at that time. 
One effect of the subcommittee I s modifications of S. 505 was t,) change 
13 
its title to S. 1555, 'Which it retained throughout the session. The bill re-
ported to the Comrnit':(~e .. m Loter and Public '!Jelfare wa!: tl1f~I~ eonsidered uy 
that full committee and Ira. number of substantial changes lt made.? Those changes 
which stren;~~;tb~ned the bill t s la.bor rt~:cnn provisions were a.ccomplished mostly 
through the persistence of minority members Gold'tlater and Dirksen, who took 
credit for these changes in the l1inority Report, which they filed as the lone 
dissenters in a final thirteen to thO corrunittee vote to report the bill to the 
Senate. 
These changes may be summarized as follows: 
a. Stricter ):'er)()rting requirements of unions I disciplining, fining, and sus-
pension procedures. 
b. Stl'icter rcpor't:int; cf union salaries and other disbursements, past con-
flicts of interest, a.nd any loans to ofneol's and employe~s. 
~. Exclusion from union office for failure to file information required by 
the bill. 
d. Weaker requir-ements for employer reports under the act. 
e. Provision that the act liould not pre-empt rlghh; of states to punish the 
8 
same offenses under state laws. 
These additions by no means ac,~omplished Goldwat .. :;r f s and Dirksen's full 
6Labor-t.ia.nagem~n~ .1~eporting, p. 5. 
?Ibid. 
S Ibid., p. S9-94. 
14 
intentions for labor reform, and they set forth in their minority report 
their firm intention to seek further amendments on the Senate floor. Senator 
Prouty, in sympathy with the two dissenters, neverthe~less voted in favor of 
reporting the bill to the Senate because he believed this was the course to 
assure some labor legislation in the current session.9 
Early- in March, JiAjoritr Leader Johnson suggested to Minority Leader Dirk-
sen that the Committee delay reporting the bill until the House had acted on 
labor reform. Johnson believed that the House would probably ldll the labor 
bills as it had in 1958. Dirksen favored such a delay to sidetrack what he 
considered the weak Kennedy-Ervin bill. Johnson's move was interpreted to be 
his tirst step to cut the ground out trom under Kennedy's long-range program 
to attain the prestige tor the presidential nomination. Dirksen proposed the 
delay to the Committee, but the generally pro-labor sentiment in the Committee 
at this time resulted in a vote to reject a delay. The Committee agreed, 
however, to postpone the consideration ot controversial Taft-Hartley amend-
ments, propcs:~ls certain to bring on long and bitter debate which would pro-
bably be tatal tor the labor retorm bill. At the suggestion ot the Democrats 
on the Committee, a twelve-man "blue-ribbon" panel ot labor law experts under 
the chairmanship of Protessor Cox was selected to study amendments to the 
Ta£t-Hartley Act and submit recommendations to the Senate later in the 
session.ll This plan toll owed Kennedy's position that labor retorm and Tatt-
Hartley amendments must be kept as separate as possible and be dealt with in 
9Ibid., p. 89-94. 
lONeweweek, LIlI (March 16, 1959), 26. 
llLabor Management ReP2rti¥, p. 5. 
15 
separate bills. However, several amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act on 
points regarded as not controversial liere included in the Kennedy-Ervin bill 
as approved by the Committee. This fact made Kennedy's position appear in-
consistent and prevented his concept of the two-package approach from gaining 
general acceptance in the Senate. 
Senate Debate. Debate in the Senate on the Kennedy-Ervin bill as amended 
in the Committee on Labor and Public t'#e1fare began on Thursday, April 16, 1959. 
14:ore than one hundred amendments were already awaiting consideration in the 
Upper House, and scores more were yet to be introduced.12 The control of the 
noor time for consideration of the amendments and the bill, was, of course, 
the crucial element in determining which amendments were to be considered and 
which speakers were to be heard. Curiously enough Senator Ervin, co-sponsor 
of the Kennedy.o..Ervin bill, was the first to speak on amending the bill. Ervin 
proposed to strike out for consistency's sake the six non-germane amendments 
to the Taft-Hartley Act which were still in the bill, favol" :'.1"18 instead the 
absolute 6.-:'1p1ication of the Kennedy two-package approach. Kennedy exp1a.ined 
that the amendments were in the bill as a commitment to former Senator Smith 
of New Jersey during the consideration ot the Kennedy-Ives bill ot the last 
session, and that he (Iennedy') expected that the amendments would help the 
bill when it reached the House. 
The amendments to which these senators referred were contained in Title V 
ot the reported bill, and could be classified as generally pro-labor. There-
tore Go1dwaterl ) and McClellan endorsed Ervin's amendment, McClellan promising 
12COnsressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., 1959, p. 11. 
13 A.s Senator Goldwater was the most vigorous proponent in the Senate of 
16 
not to propose controversial amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act for inclusion 
in the Kennedy-Ervin bill, it Kennedy would agree to drop Title VI. 
Senator Karl Mundt (Rep. S.D.), vice-chairman ot the Senate Rackets 
Committee, then spoke for an hour in support of Ervin's amendment and the de-
bate was carried on to Tuesday, April 21. 
Goldwater then obtained the floor and threatened that days and days of 
debate would be consumed in discussing other Taft-Hartley amendments unless 
Title VI were dropped from the bill, and urged that Kennedy wait for the "blue 
ribbon" committee recommendations regarding Taft-Hartley amendments •. Kennedy' 
replied that he could not in any case bind the Senate not to c;)nsid.er other 
amendments to Taft-Hartley when it pleased. 
Senator Jacob Javits (Rep. N.Y.) spoke in support of Kennedy's POoH.ion 
and claimed that the Title VI provisions regarding rtno-man's land," the 
building and construction trades workers, and the problem of economic strik-
ers' voting rights in representation elections had to be dealt with in the 
present bill. 
Senator John Cooper (Rep. Ky.), like Javits a minority member of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, also spoke for Kennedy's po':;i-
tion, while Democratic Senators Lausche and Smathers, of Ohio and Florida 
respectively, spoke briefly on behalf of the Ervin amendment. 
After an interruption in the debate for the purpose of considering 
Christian Herter's nomination as new Secretar.y of State (approved unanimously) 
Senator Michael Mansfield (Dem. Mont.), the maj ori ty "1ifuip, It proposed limi-
the reader should asswne that except where otherwise indicated he supported 
amendments Senator Kennedy opposed, and vice-versa. 
tation of further debate on the amendment to twenty rrinutes. The proposal 
was adopted unanimously. 
17 
Senator Ervin, speaking in conclusion, stated that he believed the 
Kennedy-Ives bill was defeated because of the non-germane Tn.ft-Hartley amend-
ments in it. Kennedy concluded his argument by contending that Secretary of 
Labor Mitchell himself suggested the coverage of the topics in Title VI. A 
roll call vote resulted in a defeat for the Ervin amendment by a count of 
twenty-seven yeas to sixty-seven nays. In view of the prestige of th~ adher-
ents of the Ervin amenrunent, this defeat was surprisingly one-sided. But it 
apparently rei'1ects the confidence in Senator Kennedy at this stage by members 
of the Senate, still not too concerned about this bill and relatively unin-
formed about its contents. 
Senator Dirksen immediately precipitated another debate by proposing a 
substitute for Title VI of the Kennedy-Ervin bill, taken verbatim from Title V 
of the Administration bill. Johnson, after consultation with Dirksen and 
Goldwater, proposed a two-hour limitation on debate on the Dirksen amendment, 
which limitation was approved. 
Goldwater explained that -the Dj.]~ksen amendment included other Taft-Hartley 
amendments in addition to some of those in Title VI, and would obviate necessi-
ty for further Taft-Hartley amendments, a reversal of his position that the 
Senate woule wait for the "blue-ribbon" committee recommendations. In speaking 
against the Dirksen amendment, Kennedy warned that under Senate rules further 
amendments could not be considered dealing with the topics cGntcdned in the Ad-
ministration bill substitute for Title VI of his bill. Again the vote re-
sulted in a rather lop-sided victory for Kennedy, twenty-four in favor of 
the Dirksen amendment to sixty-seven opposed. Goldwater offered a minor 
amendment regarding the definition of a union officer, but the debate was 
carried over to the following day as the Senate adjourned for the day. 
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On Wednesday, April 22. McClellan submitted several amendments to the 
Kennedy.Ervin bill which were ordered to lie on the table and be printed, and 
the Senate resumed consideration of the Goldwater union officer amendment. 
That is, some of the Senate--hardly a quorum, for when the question was put 
on the amendment it was approved, two votes for to none against. Evidently 
Kennedy waS notified at this stage and when he returned to the chamber Gold-
water asked that the amendment vote be reconsidered. He and Kennedy then 
entered a hot debate over this seemingly minor issue, and Kennedy offered a 
substit¢e,' definition of union officer, claiming that Goldwater's definition 
was too broad. In this argument Javits supported Goldwater. During Jants' 
remarks K~dy apparently conferred with Goldwater on a SUbstitute which 
Kennedy then proposed and which was approved without difficulty. The debate 
on this tragmentary issue foreshadowed the heat of the debate which would 
followion;the more serious problems on which the pro- and anti- forces were 
divid-.:i. 
B,lll!! Rights. One of those nroblems presented itself at once with the 
introduction by Senator McClellan of the celebrated "Bill of Rights" amend-
mente 
Mcdlellan and Senator Kennedy were known to be good friends, but Gold-
water ~new, 'that any hope for the Senate to place serious "stiffeners" in the 
Kenn~dy-E~in labor bill would have to have the supoort of McClellan, who en-
j01ed end~~ prestige in the field of labor reform as a result of his 
Rackets C~mmi~tee hearings. Goldwater persuaded McClellan that he would have 
to fight,~~dy" on the issue, and part of that persuasion came in the form 
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of pressure by business groups whom Goldwater induced to bombard McClellan 
14 
with letters. But it was with great conviction and emphasis that McClellan 
introduced the biggest issue of the Senate consideration of the bill-the BUl 
of Rights for union members--after a two-hour speech to the Senate in which he 
spelled out the drastic need for stitf labor reform legislation. This raised 
for the first time in the consideration of the bill the question of a serious 
departure from previous Federal legislative action in the labor area. 
McClel1~~ta Bill of Rights injecteci the Federal Government squarely in the 
middle as regulator of internal '.union affui.rs. Previously, Federal legislation 
a.ffecting labor-management relations had confined i taelf to regulating the eon-
duct of relations between management and labor. There were seven principal 
provisions in the amendment offereci by McClellan: 
a. Guarantee of equal rights to all union members 
b. Guarantee of free speech to all union members 
c. Guarantee of .free assembly to union members 
d. Guarantee of freedom from arbitrary financial exactions 
e. Provision of right to sue the union organization by members 
f. Guarantee of freedom from improper disciplinary aotions by unions against 
their members 
g. Provision for the Secretary of Labor to protect the enumerated rights. 
Kennedy' quickly recognized that a vital attack was in the making 'Which 
would seriously alter the nature of the legislation he had introduced and 
brought relatively unscathed to this point. He obtained the tloor and 
attacked the Bill of Rights amendment as unnecessary, claiming that the pend-
ing bill, state law, and the Taft-Hartley Act covered the areas adequately 
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a claim of uncertain valirlity. Kennedy also warned that adoption of the 
amend~ent might result in pre-emption by the bill in this field to the detri-
ment of the other legal safeguards now in etfect. 
A series ot speakers was then ~eard in debate OYer the Bill of Rights: 
Morse (Oem. Oreg.), Carroll (Oem. Col.), and Allott (Rep. Col.) in oPpoRition 
to the ~~ndment, and Lausche (Dem. 0.) and Holland (Dem. Fla.) in favor of 
it. In the space ot leBs than an hour Kennedy held forty conterences on the 
" floor, developing and directing strategy to deteat this amendment. McClellan 
weakened opposition to the amendment by proposing a {modification, agreed to 
unanimously, to prevent the pre-emption danger Kennedy had mentioned. 
, It was already late in the day when Johnson proposed that the vote on 
f : 
the ~ndment be taken at 6:00 p.m., with debate until that time to be evenly 
I 
divlde4. This motion was approved unanimously and both sides began immedi-
at,ly;:to collect their respective adherents tor the showdown. Kennedy and 
~Ctellan gave their concluding arguments, adding little to the gist of their 
, P%'8FOUS remarks. In the roll-call vote that followed, the amendment was 
.pp~ved by a vote of forty-seven in favor to forty-six against, with tive 
abserices. ; A motion was made to lay on the table a prOpOsal to reconsider 
'thi" vote~' The aiaendment narrowly ewcaped de!eat in this maneuver when a 
. \ ' 
, 
t9rtf-fivero forly-five tie was broken by Vice-President Nixon, when in 
~ . " " : , 
" 
exe,cisinghis prerogative to vote in the event of a tie-vote in the Senate 
\\ . 1'1 . 
,'; 
he oast hi~, ,ballot in favor of the Bill of Rights. 
,The a;~,~~,l11ce of five senators at the time of the voting was the margin of 
'. \' '\ 
\ 1 , 
diffe~nce between success and de teat for the McClellan Bill of Rights. Sena-
\ 
tors Douglas (Oem. Ill.) and Humphrey (Dem. 1-11nn.), had they been present. 
would sur:ely have \~nfluenced the outcome in the other direction. Humphrey 
21 
was absent on a speaking tour in Oregon; when he was informed of the develop-
menta in Washington, he hastened back, too late, as it turned out, to remedy 
15 the darnage for Kennedy. 
It was not contended that Humphrey's ambition for the Democratic presi-
dential nomination in 1960 cause~ him intentionally to absent himself, since 
it is unlikely that anyone foresaw that this issue would arise at the time it 
did with the even division ot votes that occurred. However, it has been con-
tended that Senator Johnson, also prominent in consideration for the Democratic 
nomination, may have tried in this issue to weaken Kennedy as an opponent. It 
was noted that Senators Dodd (Dem. Conn.) and Chavez (Dem. N. Max.), reliable 
Johnson supporters, voted for the McClellan amend'!lent. 
After the final vote on the McClellan amendment, the Senate recessed unti 
10:00 a.m. Thursd3.y. April 23. Senator lennedy, having suffered the first 
serious setback in his attempt to push through a moderate labor reform bill, 
now had the problem of restoring his control over the forces which were in mo-
tion to co~inue to transform the scope of the bill tar beyond Kennedy's in-
tentions. ' 
ottier !uMndments. On Thursday Senator Goldwater opened the day's consi-
deration otithe bill by calling up his amendment tor definition of a labor or-
ganization ll Klennedy's staff personnel conferred with Goldwater's on the ques-
tion and agreed to a compromise which was then proposed by Kennedy as an amend-
ment to tqeGoldwater amendment and adopted without difficulty by the Senate. 
Senat:orMcC1ellan called up the next in his series of amendments, this 
one aimed at,strengthening the provision for reporting requirements for 
$ LXXIII (May 4, 1959), 11. 
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employers hiring labor consultants. Kennedy had some ideas to offer on 
this ai'llendment and during two quorum call delays ]l.1cClellan and Kennedy worked 
out a substitute amendment which both then endorsed and which was approved 1>7 .. ' 
the Senate without debate. 
Senator Dodd offered a brief amendment which would require union organi-
zations to notify their members in writing of elections to be held. Kennedy 
opposed this uroposal, citing the cost involved and the adequate nature of 
other means of notification. The Dodd amendment was adopted, however, by a 
voice vote. 
Goldwater immediately called up his next amendment allowing union mem-
bers access to union records. Again, Kennedy spoke in opposition to the pro-
posal on the basis that it would permit undue harrassment of unions by dis-
satisfied individuals. Kennedy threatened to request the yeas and nays on the 
amendment, a threat quickly accepted by Goldwater who himself made the request 
Hajority Leader Johnson then rose to offer a proposal that debate on all 
amendments to S.1555 be limited to one hour, and that the debate on passage 
be limited to thr~e hours, to be evenly divided between the opponent forces. 
During Johnson's remarks, Kennedy and Goldwater met to seek a compromise on 
the Goldwater union-~cords access amendment, and when Johnson had finished 
speaking, Goldwater offered a modification of his amendment, limiting access 
to records to those who could show cause for the request. Goldwater also 
rescinded his request for the' yeas and nays, and the Senate approved the 
modified amendment l'.1.thout further debate. 
Senator HcClellan then called up his amendment dealing with the establish-
ment of a fiduciary relationship between union officials and union funds; there 
was no outright opposition to this amendment and after a short discussion of 
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its meaning it was adopted by voice vote. McClellan was .'l co-sponsor of 
the next amendment, offered by ~,enator Javits and also co-sponsored by Sena-
tors Prouty and Allott. The amendment spedfied the method of recovery of 
misappropriated union funds and was adopted without debate. A ~inor amendment 
correcting some unclear language was offered by McClellan and adopted without 
discussion, and then Senator Kennedy proposed an amendment Nith McClellan to 
make shakedown picketing penalties of the Kennedy-Ervin bill similar to those 
prescribed in the Hobbs Act. McClellan remarked prior to the vote that he 
was reserving the right to go farther than this amendment did in dealing with 
organizational and recognitional ~icketing. The Kennedy~1cClellan amendment 
was approved unanimously. 
It was apparent by this time that Senator Kennedy realized that the 
Senate disposition to amend his bill heavily was so strong that his best 
course lay in participating in the process and to the greatest degree con-
sonant with harmony, mitigating the extent to which these amendments would 
depart from the moderate course he had set for the legislation. If his in-
tention had been merely to foster legislation that would go soft on labor re-
form, he could have fought all the stiffener amendments and stood on a pro-
labor record. His intention seems rather to have been, however, to push 
through a labor reform bill which would by its very name associate him with 
labor reform, but which in its moderation would not alienate labor grouus from 
him. The goal was enactment of a bill bearing his name, and his strategy 
when faced with threats to enactment, first evident in the McClellan Bill of 
Rights amendment and subsequent amendments in the Senate, was consistent to 
achieve tha.t end. 
Senator Case (Rep. N.J.) called up his uendine amendment which Drovided 
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tha.t the National Labor Relations Board would decide which striking employees 
might vote in a representation election. Kennedy clarified its mea.ning and 
endorsed it; the Senate passed it without further discussion. 
Goldwater then called UP his amendment to strike out the two hundred and 
fifty dollars minim~~ requirement for loan-repOrting by unions to their offi~ 
cers and employees. Kennedy and Goldwater carried the debate on the question 
and Kennedy was once again ad,~nt in opposition to C70ldwater's proposal. It 
was a relatively minor question and apparently Kennedy sensed that the Senate 
was not overly concerned with it. He and Goldwater decided to rest judgment 
with the Senate on the question. Senator Htunphrey asked for a division on the 
voting, and on the vote Goldwater's amendment was rejected. Thus encouraged, 
Kennedy also refused to compromise on the next question, an amendment offered 
by Senator Curtis (Rep.Neb.) providing heavy penalties for depriving union 
members of their ri~lts. Kennedy took the position that this area was already 
adequately covered in the bill as amended, and the Senate rejected the Curtis 
amendment. 
Coldwater returned to the fray with another amendment, this one defining 
a secret ballot. Kennedy requested a quorum call and conferred with CfOldwater 
on the language of his amen~~ent. Goldwater off~red substitute language, 
another quorum call conference was held and the amendment further modified. 
Kennedy then endorsed the amendment as modified and it was passed by the 
Senate. 
Senator Allott then called up his amendment dealing with one of the key 
questions in the whole labor reform debate, that of ttno man's land. It His pro-
posal would allow state courts or agencies to assume jurisdiction in cases de-
clined by the National Labor Relations Board. Allott withdrew his amendment 
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in favor of Senator McClellan's amendment on the same subject, and he and 
Senator Curtis co-sponsored the lIcClellan proposal which Allott termed better 
than his own. Senator Kennedy yielded fifteen minutes of debate time to Sena-
tor Aorse "Who attacked the Allott amendment (he had evidently prepared his 
speee. prior to Allott's withdrawal of his amendment), suggesting that admin-
istrative law tribunals were much preferable, and effective for the purpose. 
Digressing for a time, Morse fu,'!led agai.nst the unanimous consent agreement 
under which the Senate was 'Jperating which limited debate on a .. nendmentn nand 
amendments thereton to one hour each. Kennedy spoke briefly against the 
amendment, evidently confident that he had the votes to defeat it. The vote 
on the HcClellan amendment followed and it was rejected by a vote of thirty-
nine in favor to fifty-two opposed--a.nother success for Kenned~t. 
Shortly thereafter Kennedy agreed to a.ccept tlro ~IcClellan amendments, the 
first requiring that copies of oollective bargaining agreements affecting union 
members be provided them, and the second prohibiting criminals from holding 
union office for five years from date of conviotion, and eliminating from the 
bill the provision that the Seoretary of Labor shall determine whether a man 
is fit for union offioe. Both amendments passed without opposition following 
Kennedy's acceptance of them. 
Kennedy, in a receptive mood, then enthusiastically approved an amp~d­
mont offered by Senator Gore of Tennessee to outlaw hot-cs.rgo agreements be-
tween common-carriers and labor organizations. This proposal involved another 
crucial issue in the labor reform debate, but the Gore amendment, lim! ting 
applicability to ncommon-carriers," was acceptable to Kennedy because it would 
hurt only the Teamsters union. Kennedy was happy to accept this limitation as 
he feared that the "hot-ca:r-go" prohibition would be placed in the bill with 
blanket coverage l a possibility he hoped to circl1mvent in Gore's amendment. 
!,IcClallan suggested to Go~ that lanp:ua.ge be inserted in his aml'mdment which 
would prohibit c~mmon-carriers from ceasing to do business with any other f)!U-
'ployers as a result of the hot-cargo practice. Gore accepted the suggestion 
a.nd the amenl~i;1ent, so modified, was adopted. 
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Goldl'Tater then called up an amencr:1ent providing that nractlcing attorneys 
need not report any confi.dential, lawf'.~l infoI"W..<ttion under the Noortine re-
quirel":'lents placed on labor consultants and employers. Kenn~dy agreed to the 
proposal and it also was adopted. 
At 9:02 p.m. Johnson moved f'or adjournment until 10:00 a.m. Friday, 
April 24, promising a ~~turday session if the bill was not dis?osed of on Fri-
day. 
Senator Neuberger (Dem. Ore.) was temporarily in the presiding officer's 
chair when the Senate resumed consideration of the Kennedy-Ervin bill on Fri-
day moming. 
Senator Case opened the days debate by proposing calling up his amendment 
to withdra"T trom th-J. Secretary of La.bor di::;cretion in permitting small unions 
ot certain classes to be exempt from the reporting requirements of the bill. 
Kennedy spoke briefly in opposition to Case's amendment and it was rejected 
without further comment. 
1~e next dispute concern~d two amendments dealing with no-ma.n's land. 
Senator Cooper offered an amenctment, at Kennedy's instance, to which a substi-
tute '.vas offered by Senator Prouty which Prouty termed a compromise between the 
defeated ;\!cCle1Ian amendmont and Cooper's position. A vote was ti?ken first on 
the Prouty amendment" 'tThich was defeated by forty pro votes to fifty-three 
against; the following vote on Cooper's amendment was heavily in favor of the 
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measure, seventy-eight yeas (including Goldwater's) to fifteen nays (including 
Rrrln's and ;·!cClellan' s) • 
KennedY':3 prestige had be-,n restored in the votes on the amendments 
followinr the Bill of Right'" debacle, and his str0n~h 1,\'a,S evic;'e!1.':!ec in con-
sideration of the next, t>'foam~:md'ilentf:t offered by Senators '!\rvin and J,fcClellan 
respectively, dealing with restrlctiom~ to be placed on the union pra.ctice of 
organizational picketinr. Kennedy o?!XJsed both amendments, nrincipally, he 
said, because the sweatshops of the garment indu:'5try were l.n~lu~ed. The votes 
were lop-sided in favor of Kennedy"s position; on the Ervin allendment, the vote 
was b'enty-five to sixty-sI"ven (including Gold"rater); on t,he '"1cClellan amend-
'1 
ment the vote '"as thirty yeas (including Col<hrater's) to fifty-nine nays. 
Two more M~Clellan amend~ents were then considered. Tho first was a 
minor measure requiring union officers to be bonded. Kennedy had already 
agreed to it in conference and it was adoDted )dthout apposition. The second 
dealt with the secOfldary boycott, a key issue, and intended to fill in the 
gaps in the T&.ft-Hartley Act reg3.rding secondary boycotts, vmich although pro-
Bcribed in that 1::ni', were still in exister;ce because of difficulti"'~s in defi-
nition and enforcement. Kennedy spoke gn-.vely in opDosition to this second 
a!.'1end~lEmt ;::md stated that hs felt the hot-cargo am~nrt,'l!ent already passed was 
sufficient to deal with thtg seconda,ry boycott nroblem (Kennedy did not remind 
the :7,erw.te that the hot-cargo am'3ndll1~nt vlaS apnlicable only to common-
car'riers).. Goldwater and XcClellan pressed hard for votes on this i~sue and 
c&lle relatively close to securing adoption: forty-one yeas to ftft7 nays. 
But Kennedy was still in control. 
Senator Keating (De:-r:.. N.Y.) then offered a Sllbst1tute for an earlier 
8Jllend::.ent on "forcer. picketing by 2''''In''l.tor nrouty wM.ch had been laid aside. 
r ___ ----------. 
Prouty accepted the Keating substitute and the vote on both amendments was 
taken as one vote, eighty-six in favor, four against (only ~)enators Morse, 
5~ith, McCarthy, and McNamara voted against it). 
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It was past the supper hour by this time and the members were tired of 
the debate. Senator Dodd offtH. «i his amendment providing for recourse by local 
union organizations to the Secretary of Labor when trusteeships were ordered 
by the national or international union. As Senator Clark spoke in opposition 
to the measure, there were repeated shouts of "Votel ll from the chamber. As 
other speakers rose to discuss the amendment there were further calls for a 
vote, which, when finally taken, resulted in another comparatively close win 
for Kennedy's position in opposition to the amendment: forty-one in favor; 
fi:fty-one against. Senator Morse took a very active part in the p:t'oceedings 
at this point. He first suggested a minor change in wording in one section 
of the bill, accepted by Kennedy and adopted by vote, and then he offered a 
series of amendments all dealing with procedural and administrative questions 
raised in the bill. There was a minumum of discussion by persons other than 
?,lorse on these amendments Which were not important to the meaning of the bill; 
some were accepted and some rejected. 
Senator F..astland (Dem. 1-1188.) then offered an amendment providing for 
secret ballots prior to strikes. Kp.nnedy spoke against the proposal, declaring 
it would worsen conditions by removing union discretion as to whethnr to 
strike or not, and would prevent settling a strike threat by bargaining. 
Kennedy's remarks gave evidence of considerable impatience with FXlstland's 
prooosal. Kennedy pointed out that the same provision was defeated at the 
time of the Taft-Hartley debate; that it ",-as d~.4·,~ated again in last year's 
consideration of the Kennedy-Ives bill, and that Secretary of Labor ¥itchell 
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opnosed it. On the vote, Senators Dirksen, Coldwater, McClellan and Lausche 
joined those in favor of th~ Eastland amendment, but it was badly defeated, 
twenty-eight yeas to sixty nays. 
A Senator McCarthy (Dem.~Unn) amendment to permit unions to pay for legal 
defense of offioials but not for fines imposed was modified at the suggestion 
of Kennedy who then approved it, and subsequently withdrew his approval after 
ftuther discussion. His ohange of heart made all the differenoe and the amend-
mont was rejected by a vote whioh found only seven members voting for the &~end 
;neqt. Senator Kuchel (Rep. Calif.) then offered a Bill of Rights amend'1lEmt 
written in conjunction with Kennedy and other Republican senators,l6 co-spon-
sored by Senators Anderson (Oem. N.Mex.), Clark (Dem.Penn.), Church (Oem.Idaho) 
Neuberger (Oem.Ore.), Gore (Dem.Tenn.), Cooper (Rep.Ky.), Jav1ts (Rep.N.Y.), 
and Aiken (Rep.Vt.). Kuehel claimed this one was vastly different from the 
HoClellan Bill of Rights amendment adopted two nights before. But because ot 
the late hour an argument arose over adjournment. The amendment was ordered to 
be printed and lie on the table, and the tired senatore adjourned until Saturda • 
During the day Kennedy had regained control of the amending process on 
his bill, and seemed in a fair way to escape from the Senate with the bill 
pretty muoh the way it was at the C10S8 of the dayts session. In the two days 
sinoe adoption or the McClellan Bill of Rights amendment, Kennedy had won dis-
putes over amendments proposed by Senators r~ldwater, Curtis, MoClellan (three) 
Prouty, Ervin, Dodd, and Rastland, and lost only in a relatively minor dis-
pute over the Dodd amendment to require unions to notify members in writing of 
an il'!lpending union election. There is no doubt, however, that Kermedy com-
promised many times rather than face certain defeat, and the number of these 
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compromises exceeds by many the number of outright victories. 
Saturday, April 25, 1959 was to see the close of the original considera-
tion in the Senate of the Kennedy-Ervin labor reform bill. Kuchel continued 
his discussion of the Bill of Rights amendment he was offering as a substitute 
to the already adonted :-!cClellan measure. Clearly, Kennedy was willing to 
gamble that the tide had returned--as well as Hubert Humphrey--in his favor 
and that he might dispose of the only serious alteration in the bill he had 
proposed. Kuchel apologized for not having a copy of his amendment available 
for all the senators, but explained that the majority leader's eagerness to 
obtain a final vote on the bill the night before had prevented him from having 
his amendment printed in time. That tact no doubt accounted for much of the 
haggling over wording that tollowed Kuchel's remarks. Actually, the substitute 
was very similar to McClellan's proposal and acoomplished only two changes: 
first, to remove from the Secretary of Labor the power, conferred in the bill, 
to seek injunotions when a union member's rights had allegedly been violated 
and instead to provide that the member should seek appropriate relief in a 
Federal oourt; and secondly, to alter the provision regarding availability of 
union membership lists to prevent idle curiosity from being exercised. It was 
aoproved with surprising ease--seventy-seven in tavor (including Senators 
f-icClellan, Kennedy, and Dirksen) to fourteen against (including Goldwater). 
The Senate then disposed of the remaining pending amendments in the 
following manner: 
a. Javits' amendment requiring equal use by candidates for union office of 
all membership lists was adopted without opposition. 
b. Smathers' amendment strengthening r~re'8 hot-cargo amendment was adopted 
without opoosition. 
~---------------------------------------------------3-l~ 
c. The Curtis (Rep. Neb.) &~end~ent requiring mailing of a primary ballot to 
each member ~tohis home in union elections with two highest candidates to 
compete in final election was rejected in a voice vote. 
d. 'rhe Hundt (Rep.S.D.) amendInent concerning obtaining an honest count in 
union elections was adopted after a. compromise modificat:Lon agreed to by 
:1undt and Kennedy. 
€! • Minor amendments by Ervin, two by Iiundt and one by Kennedy (confirming the 
Secretary of Labor's injunctive powers under the act to report-filing vio-
lations) were all adopted. 
No further amendments were offered a.nd the bill was ordered engrossed fo 
its third rea.ding. Goldwa.ter spoke again against the bill, describing it as a 
f'lea-bite to a bull elephant, and when Senator Caoehart (Rep. Ind.) entered 
into some apparently superfluous remarks regarding what had and had not been 
accomplished in the bill, the senators began to shout for the vote. Dirksen 
closed the speaking with his remarks in favor of the bill as well as his com-
ments pointing out its shortcomings. 
The final vote was a.Lf!lost unani..'nously for the bill, with only Goldwater 
in opposition. The Senate a.djourned immediately after the vote. 
On April 29, 1959, Senator Kennedy delivered an address to the Senate 
concerning the bill in which he professed to be very proud of the Senate's 
accomplishment. Copies of his speech were widely distributed at the ~~nator's 
own expense. Only in passing did he mention that "the future of this bill will 
ft 17 again be plagued by the usual ••• powerful pressures ••• ; he could not 
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Speech by the Hon. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts in the Senate of 
the United states, Wednesday, April 29, 1959, "The Facts about the Kennedy-
Ervin Labor Bill." 
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have suspected what was about to happen in the consideration of his bill by 
the House of Representatives. 
rr----------. 
CHAPTER !Y 
HOUSE CONSIDERATION 
Hearings on 1abor-management reform legislation were begun by a Joint 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor on March 4, 1959, 
in Washington, D.C., and continued there throughout March and April. The two 
subcommittees canbined for the purpose of these hearings were the Subcommittee 
on Labor-t\fanagem.ent Relations and the Subcommittee on Labor standards. Carl 
Perkins (Dem.K7.) was chairman of the former subcommittee and Phil Landrum 
(Dem.Ga.) of the latter. In each case the composition was tour Democrats to 
two Republicans, making the Joint Subcommittee composition eight Democrats 
and four Republicans. Apart from the two chairmen, all the members were from 
stat.es in the North. 
House Comm1ttee Hearings. Ot the first twenty-two bills referred to the 
Joint Subcommittee for hearings, about halt were versions of the Kennedy-Ervin 
bill, and the other half patterned rather closely after the more strict Ad-
1 
ministration bill in the Senate. A bill introduced by George McGovern 
(Oem.S.Dak.) and one offered by Edith Green (Dam.Ore.) led the list of bills 
similar to the Kennedy"-Ervin bill. Representative James Roosevelt (Dem.Calif.) 
1New York Times, August 2, 1959, 
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sponsored a bill less strict than any of the above-mentioned proposals, but 
was exceeded in II mode rat ionlt by Representative Ludwig Teller (Dem.N.Y.), who 
offered a bill considered the least distasteful to organized labor.2 
After adoption of the Kennedy-Brvin bill in the Senate, the Joint Sub-
committee continued its lengthy hearings throughout May, collecting testimony 
in Los Angeles, California May 28 and 29, finally concluding the hearings in 
Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1959. The hearings comprise 2,675 pages of 
testimony in tive volumes; heard were 126 witnesses, some forty-eight of whom 
appeared representing labor organizations. The remaining witnesses (tifty-
seven) represented management groups, government agencies (tour), eongress-
men, and witnesses testifYing in the public interest. George Meany and Secre-
tary ot Labor Mitchell again testitied.) 
After the conclusion ot the hearings, the Joint Subcommittee began the 
task ot dratting the bill to be presented to the full Comm1ttee on Labor. Pro-
gress was too slow to satisl7 the committee, however, and in mid-June it voted 
twenty-two to ten to b1PQsS the Joint Subcommittee and take up the drafting ot 
the bill directly in the full committee ot thirty members, who were also 
divided twenty to ten bttween Democrats and Republicans. However, Chaiman Bar-
den could be counted on to push tor strict labor retorm, and four otte r 
Southern Democrats on the committee also were considered sympathetic to strin-
gent retorm. measures. 
Using the Kennedy-Ervin bill as a basis for argument, since it had alrea~ 
2 Ibid., p. 56. 
3 Hearings before lh! Joint Subcoll!t1littee !l! The C<»mnittee 2n Education !ml 
Labor. House gl Representatives. 8..Q.th Cong_, 1.~ • .2!l Labor-v...anagement Reform 
Legislation. 
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been approved by the Senate, the co~~ttee labored over each section in-
dividually, with deep disagreements and irritations evident in the discussions~ 
Speaking in the House on June 12, 1959 Representative Dent (Dem.Pa.) ex-
plained that strong labor opposition at that time to reform proposals was 
caused by fears that legislation following so closely on the McClellan Com-
mittee scandal revelations would be overly punitive. 
The committee eventually accomplished 102 changes tram the Kennedy-Ervin 
bill, chief among which was the deletion ot criminal penalties for violations 
of its provisions. Union lobbying pressures were particularly acute at this 
time, but enough Democrats voted with Republicans to keep the bill from l:eing 
buried in committee, and a seventeen to thirteen vote resulted in a continua-
tion of the committee work on the bill. 5 
Finally, on July 23, 1959, the'~mm1ttee voted sixteen to fourteen to 
report the bill to the House; this, in spite of the fact that only five members 
of the committee actually were in favor of the bill as it stood. The remaining 
members regarded it either as too tough or too sort on labor, and voted for it 
only to give it a noor test in the House and press there for desired amend-
menta. Ten Democrats and six Republicans voted for it while refusing to be 
6 
committed to support it in the House. The bill emerged from the committee as 
HR 8342, popularly known as the Elliott bill after its sponsor, Representative 
Carl Elliott (Dem.Ala.).7 
4aueinesw Week, No. 1557 (June 27, 1959), 125. 
5Time, LXXIV (July 27, 1959), 13. 
6 New York Times, August 12, 1959, article by Joseph Loftus, section 11 p. • 
--
7~ LXXIV (August 3, 1959), 17. 
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Despite deletion of criminal penalties in the Kennedy-Ervin bill, and 
changes in the no-man's land provision (Senate version: fJeave the problem to 
the states as long as they apoly Federal law) to provide that an enlarged 
National Labor Relations Board would handle the eases, the bill was largely 
sLrnilar to the Ke .nady-Ervin bill in its degree of labor reform intended. 
The Elliott bill was generally regarded as "softer" than the Kennedy'-
Ervin bUl, hOllrever, and drew opposition from proponents of strict labor refo 
House I.finority r ~ader Halleck (Rep. Ind.) called it Ita diluted version of a 
watered-down billnS while the AFL-CIO rejected both it and the Kennedy-Ervin 
bill, sponsoring instead the bill proposed by Representative John Shelley 
9 (Dem. Calif.) • 
.. The crucial days had arrived for the labor reform bills, and the actin'!'" 
ties of those supporting the various proposals reached a height of intensity. 
'rhe Teamster Union lobbyists, led by Sidney Zagri, who had remained aloof from 
the battle until the bills were under consideration in the House Committee now 
10 
exerted all the pressure at their command on the congressmen. Halleck and 
Senator Dirksen persuaded President Eisenhower to exercise his fullest in flu-
enos at this time by the strongest means available, a nationwide television 
address on the subjeot of labor retorm legislation on August 6, 1959. In his 
address the President appealed for effective labor reform. 
On the same evening as the President's speech, George Heany, President 0 
the AFL-CIO, spoke over a nationwide radio network on behalf ot moderate labor 
p. 17. 
SIbid., p. 17. 
9 
.!!!!, York Timea. August 6, 1959, article by Joseph Loftus,section 1, 
lOTime, LXXIV (July 27, 1959), 13. 
~ll r . rlesi slat ion. Robert KennodT, McClellan COIIIIlIitt .. counsel, 37 appeared on the 
L 
Jack Paar television program on July 23, 1959 and requested viewers of the pro-
gram to send letters to their congressmen demanding a labor reform bill. A few 
days later Kennedy again apneared on a nationwide television program, this time 
a.s a. guest on "Meet the Press," which program explored with Kennedy the need 
12 for labor legislation. Senator Goldwater, appearing on the Martin Agronsky 
television program on August 7, 1959, spoke for strict labor reform. Also on 
August 7 Representative Madden (Dem. Ind.), an advocate of Kennedy'-F.rvin t:rpe 
labor reform, (uscu5sed the legislative situation on labor reform on the Dave 
Garroway television show, a network program. 
Other appeals to the public were those of Senate i Democratic llJhip 'Hans-
field (Dem.Mont.) and Senator Kenneth Y.eating (Dem.N.Y.) who appeared on an 
eastern states television program commenting that the public demane for a good 
• 13 labor refom bUl was being keenly felt in the Congress. Halleck and Repre-
sentative John McCormack (Dam.Mass.), the House Majority Leader, stated oppos-
ing views on the labor reform bills on another network program on television.14 
Senator Kennedy was interviewed on another eastern states television program 
and stated at the time that a labor reform bill could be achieved in three 
15 
weeks if the House would accept the Elliott bill. And on August 10, 1959, 
Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn made an address on a nationwide radio network 
U New !2!:!s. TilIlee, August 14, 1959, article by Robert F. \\hl tne,., sec. 1, 
p. 14. 
12 United states News. XLVII (August 10, 1959), 34. 
13New ~ ... Time;;;;;;;;;;,;;;.s . ... August 14, 1959, article by Whitney, sec. 1, p. 14. 
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advocating adoption of the F..l.liott bill.16 It was the first tilne in more 
than five years that the Speaker had taken such a step on a legislative pro-
posal, and it emphasizes the extent of the efforts expended at this time on the 
labor bills. 
The public was deluged with these and other apl»a1s, most of which en-
couraged or invited the public to write their congressmen on behalf of the 
various proposals. It is doubtful if any legislative deliberations in modern 
congressional history have involved the constant propaganda barrage and con-
tinuous aT'. (,"'ls to public opinion which took place in late July and early 
A.ugust of ).'-15'1. 
The effect of the appeals to the people was astonishing and represented 
the turning point in the trend of labor reform legislation in the Eighty-Sixth 
Congress, First Session. Following Robert Kennedy's television ap~e~rances 
congressmen were flooded with letters demanding labor reform. The volume in-
creased markedly in response to the Eisenhower address. For e~ample, Senator 
Dirksen received more than two thousand letters in one cL'lY on the subject. Al 
most all the congressmen experienced large inoreases, most of the ~4il appealin 
for stronger reform.. Up to that time the unions had been carrying on an or-
ganized letter and card-writing oampaign, many involving just an insertion of 
the members' names on prepared messages. l ? The reversal of the action being 
requested from the congressmen was indeed remarkable, as the organized trend 
moved the other way with pro-reform newspapers printing prepared messages 
(the Chicago Tribune's prepared message, aocompani~d by addresses of local 
16 Chicago Sun-TL~s, August 11, 1959, article by Tom Littlewood, pt.l, 
p. 1. 
17 United states News 
congressmen no doubt had much to do with the response reported by Dirksen) 
advocating a stringent labor reform bill. 
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1~e pressure for stricter labor reform had a snowballing effect. ~~en 
on July 27 Representatives Philip Landrurrl (Dem.Ga.) and Robert Griffin (Rep_ 
Mich.) introduced HR 8400, known thereafter as the Landrum-Griffin bill, soft-
reform forces recognized the deep trouble ahead. It was at thiq time that 
Senator McClellan released the interim report of the Senate Rackets Committee, 
covering, among others, abuses revealed in the Teamsters Union, the Detroit 
Institute of Laundering, and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen 
of North America. Newspapers and periodicals took sides in advocating passage 
of the favorite contending bills, but the pressure was heaviest for passage of 
the Landrum-Griffin bill. 
House Debate. The Elliott bill, which represented in essence the hopes 
for agreement by the House on the same type of legislation as the Senate 
nassed in the Kenne~-Ervin bill, was referred next to the House Rules Com-
mittee, which opened hearings on it on August 4. The proponents of the three 
bills, which were popularly regarded as similar to three types of boiled egg--
soft (Shelley), medium (Elliott) and hard (Landrum-Griffin)--regarded the de-
liberations of the Rules Committee as very important to their res!j~~tive hopes. 
The Rules Committee would decide suoh matters as time limits for debate, 
whether and under what circumstanoes amendments could be made, and in what or-
der bills could be oonsidered. 
Tempers were already short and during the Rules Committee hearings Lan-
drum called Representative Madden of Indiana, considered pro-union, a "son-of-
40 ~ ••• ,t If halting before com.pleting the epithet.1S The committee heard tes-
~1mony from Representatives r~ndrum, Shelley, Dent, Roosevelt, Bailey (Dem.W.Va. 
"!riffin, and Hoftman(Ren.?~ich.).t before granting an open rule of six hours de-
)ate and waiving points of order. The most important effect of the open rule 
Jas to permit noor amendments to th.;:; 'Slliott bill" the goal of most of the mem-
bers who voted it out of the House Labor Committee. 
The House debated the labor reform bills known as the Elliott, the 
~helley" and the ta.ndrum-Griffin bills, respecttvely, from August 11 to Au-
~st 14. Representative Smith (Dem.lrJ.Va.), leader of the Southern bloc in the 
House and chairman of the Rules Committee, called up HR 338 for consideration}9 
this measure provided that the House should resolve itself into the Committee 
of the vfuole in the State of the Union for consideration of HR 8342 (the Elliott 
bill). The six hours debate was to be confined to HR 8342 and was to be divided 
evenly between the proponents and the opponents of the bill" and was to be con-
trolled by the chairman of and the ranking minority member of the House Com-
mitee on Education and Labor. It also provided that after passage of HR 8342 
the Hous~ Committee on Education and Labor should be discharged from further 
consideration ot 5.1555. It would then be in order to strike out all after 
the enacting clause in 5.1555 and substitute provisions of HR 8342 as passed. 
The House would then request a conference from the Senate" and the Speaker 
20 
would appoint the conferees for the House. 
l8Chicago Sun-Times" August 5, 1959, nt. 1, p. 4. 
19~ LXXIV (August 31, 1959), 13. 
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Representative Srr.ith then gave a lucid and succinct explanation of the 
parliamentary situation on the consideration of the three bills. First# he 
said, the Elliott bill would be considered; then, when read for amendment at 
the end of the first section it wC\uld be in order to offer the Landrum-Griffin 
bill as an amendment, and the Shelley bill. Smith expressed the hope that the 
house would at that point vote the Landrum-Griffin bill up and the Shelley 
bill down. The I.andrum-Griffin bill would then be reported to the House and 
voted on. If defeated, then the committee bill (the Elliott bill) would be 
open to the amendments everyone was ready to advance. The nrovisions of 
8.1555 would first be substituted, then stricken, and the House bill as 
amended, inserted, and conferees appointed. 
Smith then stated that this was the most remarkable situation tha.t had 
come to his attention as a member of Congress: that two subcommittees heard 
the t(;!stimony on the bill but did not write it. It was written in full House 
Labor Committee by members who had not been on the subcommittees which heard 
the testL~ony. Then it was voted f~~orably out of the full committee on the 
votes ~f its opponents; of the five members who supported it in reality, not 
one had heard the testimony before the suboommittees. Smith said it reminded 
hi,n of John Rankin's couplet about the Arkansas Snake Railroadt 
It wiggled in and it wobbled out 
And left the people all in doubt 
As to whether in its zig-zag traok 
It was going west or coming back.2l 
Smith's resolutions on the Rules were adopted, the House resolved itself 
into the Committee of the vlliole, and the debate began on the Elliott bill. 
The bill, which carried with it the fate of the Kenned.v-Ervin type of labor 
21Ibid., p. 12858. 
~ reform in the House, had a serious first strike against it in havinf: time 
controlled by its opponent, Committee Chairman Barden. The next two days were 
conswned in lengthy debate, ranging over the now familiar arguments. Some thir 
ty speakers favored the Landrum.ariffin bill; seventeen spoke for the Elliott 
bill and only six for the Shelley bill, which was regarded as having next to 
. 22 
no chance for surnval. vfuen the bill 'fJ'as finally opened for amendment, 
A~~m Clayton Powell (D~~.N.Y.), a Negro, tried to kill the LandTUU!-Griffin 
bill by inserting in it an amen~~ent requiring racial integration in unions, 
a proposal which immediately caused an uproar in the House. On a teller count 
of votes on this ao'll.endment, it was rejected 215 to 160. Approval would almost 
certainly have doomed the bill for eventual passage as it would have turned 
southerners solidly against the bill. 
On the S&l'll6 day, Committee Counsel Robert Kennedy openly broke with 
Committee Chairman McClellan over labor reform legislation and endorsed the 
Elliott bill as including all the proposals indica.ted as necessary by the 
HcClellan Comd.ttee investigations.23 Senator Kemedy appeared briefiy in the 
House g~:lery to watch the debate. Secretary H1tchell broke a long silence 
by him to endorse the Landrum-Griffin bill.24 
On this same day J the Shelley bill was defea.ted wi. th barely a struggle 
on a vote of 245 in favor to 132 against. Barden then moved that the Committe 
of the };'hole rise, after which Landrum offered the Landrwn-Griffin bill as an 
amendment to the Committee bill still under consideration for amendment. 
22Congressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., 1959, pp. 14180, 14326, 14483 
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t Che,irrllr'1n Barden ga.ve the major address on the noor during the day, ridiculing 
thl1 :Slliott bill and calling for strict labor reform. Barden was given a 
standing ovation at the conolusion of his impassioned spee~h and the ~pplause 
frO;ll both aisles" causing the Kennedy'-ErvL"l-r::lliott supporters some con-
OVer defections in their ranks. 25 
On August 13, 1959" the House again sat as the Committee of the lJho1e 
on the Sta.te of the Union and several speakers continued the intense debate. 
The L8ndrum-Griffin adherents suddenly proposed an exemption under the Taft-
H...:.rtley Act, a stratagem devised to divJ.de organi7;ed labor opposition to the 
bill. The proposal was rejected by a vote of 183 to 179. Barden then, at 
3 :05 p.m., succeeded in gett i.ng approw..i.l fron the House ~T a vote of 276 to 26 
to close debats at 4:00 p.m. 
An amendment proposed by Representative Dowdy (Dam. Tex.) to perrnit civil 
suits rather tha.n suits by the Secretary of Labor in rights· violation cases 
was adopted after I~ndrum and Griffin gave their endorsement to it, lS6 to 157. 
Represantati va l,oser (Dem. Tenn.) propor;ed an anendment to reduce the fine for 
violence cor:md.ttee in a union hall! fro:!, t en thousand dollars to one thousand 
dollars, which was approved on a voice vote after Landrum had endorsed it as 
v;ell. Of these last minute concessions by Landrwn and Griffin.. the ~ !.2.!:! 
Times' Joseph Loftus commented: 
The wl.thdrawal of the injunction proYision \-ras designed to appeal to 
some Southern members who had long foupht such a weapon in civil 
rights legislation. The reduction in penalty was a response to those 
who complained of harshness. After the vote, it appeared in retrospect 
that the bill's chances were better than its sponsors had believed and 
that the concessions mif~t have been unnecessary. These concessions 
also reduce the bargaining area of the House in conference with the Senate 
25Ibid• and Chicago Sun-Times, August 13 .. 1959, pt. 1, p. 10. 
The withdrawal of the injunction provision has an interesting 
story behind it. It seems that Sam r~yburn's House strategist, 
Representative Richard Bolling (Dem.Eo.) planned to spring the in-
junction provision as a "sleeper" on Southern members, informing 
them only on the last minute, after the deadline for amendments 
had passed, and panicking thenl into opposition of the Landrum-Griffin 
bill. The Democrats even leaked a phony tip regarding the "sleeper" 
provision to columnist Drew Pearson, saying it was in Section 102 
of the bill. According to this story, the strategem might have 
worked had not Representative James Roosevelt risen in the House, 
unwittingly upsetting the strategy by pointing out that he had found 
a "silver lining" in the bill, in Section 609. Southerners immedi-
ately revie~gd it and worked out the amendment resulting in its 
withdrawal. 
Debate was then completed on the Landrum-Griffin amend:r.lent; if passed at 
this point then no amendment to it would be possible; if rejected, then con-
sideration ot the Elliott bill would follow. 
Landtumdemanded tellers.27 The Committee of the Hhole divided and the 
ayes won the big vote of 215 to 200, representing Committee approval of the 
bill. ThGin ~tr. Walter (Dem.Pa.), Chairman of the Committee of the 1!ihole, 
stated thatthe'bill was now reported back to the House with an amendment. 
Barden asked! for the yeas and nays on the question of adopting the Landrum-
Griffi~ b1~1; on this second big vote the count was 229 to 201 in favor of the 
, 
Landrum-Grittin bill. Only four members, among them the seriously ill Elliott, 
failed to,vote and the 430 members voting WB,S an all-time House record. 
Ninety-five Democrats joined Republicans in the winning total, ninety-two of 
28 . 
them Southerners. Sixteen of the twenty 'texans ordinarily held in line 
~6r1ew !2£!s. Times, August 14, 1959, article by Joseph Loftus, pt. 1, p. 8. 
27()n'a Itteller" vote, the members file past persons designated to count 
the vo,(~es, e ~ressed individually by the members as they pass these "tellers." 
'<;; \ 
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by Rayburn defected to vote for the bill.29 
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Speaker Rayburn announced that it was lmuossible to get an engrossment 
that same day, 80 it would have to go over until Friday, August 14. At noon 
the House reconvened and HR 8342, now the Landrum-Griffin bill., was read untU 
Barden interrupted to move unanimous consent to dispense with the reading. 
There was no objection and on Representative Kearns' (Rep.Pa.) motion to re-
commit the bill the vote was negative, 11..1 to 71; when Dingall (Dem.Mich.) de-
manded the tellers, the vote changed to 280 against and 148 in favor. The 
question then was put on passage of HR 8342 with the Landrum-Gr1tfin amendment 
in it. On this tinal vote, the last chance tor Representatives to record 
themselves on the bill, the vote was 303 tor and 125 against, and a motion to 
reconsider that vote was laid on the table. 
Barden moved to strike out all atter the enacting clause ot the Kennedy-
Ervin bUl and insert HR 8342. The motion was agreed to without the ayes and 
nays. The Lan~rittin bill, how transformed again into 5.1555, passed on 
a voice vote and another motion to reconsider the vote was laid on the table. 
Barden moved the House to request a conference with the Senate, and shortly 
thereafter the Speaker announced the names of the conferees he had appointed: 
Barden (Dem.N.C.), Perkins (Dem.Ky.), Landrum (Dem.Ga.), Thompson (Dem.N.J.), 
Kearns (Rep~Pa.), Ayres (Rep. Ohio) and Griffin (Rep.Mich.). 
Atter the vote it was immediately noted that many House members endorsed 
by labor organizations and elected with their aid had voted for the Landrum-
Griffin bill • 
. One stuQy, taking into account 254 House members elected in 1958 with 
-
29Time, LXXIV (August 31, 1959), 13. 
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the backing of one or more labor org~nizations, whowed that sixty-two of these 
voted for the Lanrl~~-Griffin bill in the bip 229-201 ~ouse vote of apnroval. 30 
Of the sixty-two, forty were Southerners,31 indicClUng they iv-ere endorsed per-
haps for one or both of two reasons: l)They W'er~ certain to be elected any-
way, or 2)They were the least anti-labor of the available candidH,tes. 
Another study sho'lfled only sixteen of 181 un.1.on-supporled coneressmen de-
fecting on the 229-201 vote.32 
Kennedy-Ervin Versus Landrum-Griffin. As the bills went into the Con-
ference Committee the differences betw60n t.he Senate and House bills, at this 
point both known as S.1555, were more of degree than of kind. The Senate-
passed Kennedy-Ervin bill took a much more limited a~proach to controls over 
picketing a.nd secondary boycotts, and provided for keeping all labor-rnanagement 
cases under Federal law, although it perr,itted state labor agencies, not 
courts, to apply that law)3 The I.andrum-Griffin bill provlded for ja1.l sen-
tences for violation of union members' rights, while the Kennedy-Ervin bill 
provided for court injunctions; Landrum-Griffin required all unions to file 
financial reports; Kennedy~Rrvin exempted approxil'!k'\tely seventy per cent of 
the smaller un1ons.34 
The following promised to be the major points of contention in tho Con-
lerence Committee: 
30Q* 2,* lli!!!, xr.vII (August 31, 1959), 38. 
31Ibid• 
32pusin.8s 1;l.ek, No. 1557 (August 22, 1959) 83. 
33Time, X!.xxrv (August 31, 1959), 13. 
34Ibid• 
a. No-man's land, involving jurisdiction over cases excluded from NLRB 
consideration. 
47 
b. Black:~iail and organizational nicketing restrictions, involvIng union 
attempts to organize a."1d force recognition of their organizations throug,h 
picketing. 
c. Secondary boycott restrictions, involving efforts by unions to t)ut pres-
sure on employers by action against other e.'l1ployers with vThol'!l they deal. 
Points of difference in less fundamental areas included: 
a. F~ent of penalties to be levied. 
b. Special exemptions to garment and construction industries. 
e. Union recognition voting rights by members out on strike. 
CHAPTER V 
The story of the conference committee deliberations between August 18 and 
September 2 is larr;ely an account of the demise of the bill originally known 
as the Kennedy-Ervin bill, and the survival of only a portion of its substance 
in a much stronger labor reform bill. After the House had appointed its con-
ferees on Friday, August 14, the Senate met on Monday, August 17, to consider 
the message from the House announcing passage of the Senat,6 bill with the Lan-
drum.-Griffin amendment and asking for a conference. Lyndon Johnson announced 
to the Senate that Johnson, Kennedy, Dirksen and McClellan had agreed that the 
Senate would have an opportunity to debate any bill agreed to in conference, 
and that the Senate conferees would ask for instructions if the sessions be-
came deadlocked. Johnson pointed out also that any member could at any time 
move to recall the bill and the conferees from conference. 
Question 2! Instructions !2 Senate Conferees. nirksen raised the ques-
tion of instructing conferees. Then ~1undt started a long argument over two 
requests, the first, for an immediate vote on the bill as passed in the House, 
and the second, for instructions to conferees to report back to the Senate 
prior to formal disagreement. His request for a vote on the Landrum-Griffin 
bill, which if adopted at, that point would have obviated need for a conference 
and killed the Kelm:?dy-Ervin bill, was rejected by Goldwater and ~1cClellan 
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ithout whose support such a vote could not hope to succeed. 'l'hey affinned 
their belief that the conference could bring out a better bill than either of 
the two was at that time. Goldwater even admitted in this connection that the 
Kennedy~Ervin was tougher in its first five titles than the Landrum-Griffin 
bill and that parts of Kennedy-Ervin were preferable. 
Vice-President Nixon refused to accept Mundt's motion for instructions 
to the conferees, saying Mundt could propose it again after the Senate agreed 
to send the bill to conference. Goldwater did promise that he would bring the 
bill back to the Senate within a week of the time that progress on it halted. 
~-1undt subsided at length, and Johnson moved that the Senate insist on its bill 
and appoint conferees. The motion carried on a voice vote, und the Vice-
President announced that the conferees for the Senate would be Kennedy, 
McNamara, Morse, Randolph, Goldwater, Dirksen, and Prouty, all the members of 
the Senate ~;ubcommittee on Labor, of the Committee on Labor and Public v/elfare. 
Johnson moved to reconsider the vote to insist on the Senate bill; Mans-
field moved to lay Johnson's motion on the table and the latter motion was 
approved without difticulty. . 
Conferenoe. Although no official transcript of the conference committee 
was published, the progress (or lack of it) was well covered in the press 
through the Washington correspondents' oontacts with the conferees. 
The Senate conferees were more seriously divided than the House team, but 
with Kennedy as chairman of the conference, and supporting him the other three 
Democrats from the Senate, Horse, l'icNamara, and Randolph, the Senate conferees 
made a determined stand for the positions taken in the Kennedy-Ervin bill. 
The House conferees were led by Graham Barden (Dem.N.C.), Chairman of 
the House Committee on Education and Labor, and although a Democrat, a strong 
advocate of the strict reforms embodied in the Landrum-Griffin bill. Support-
ing him wfltre the sponsors of the Landrum-Griffin bill, Landrum and Griffin. 
Others included Representatives Thompson (Dem.N.J.), victim of the acid-throw-
ing incident described in Chapter VI, Ayres (Rep.Ohio), who carried on the 
bitter running duel of letters and insults with James B. Carey, also described 
in Chapter VI. Rcoresentative Carl Perkins, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Labo~~anagement Relations and Representative Kearns (Rep.Pa.), rounded out a 
predominantly strong labor reform House conferee group. 
The conference opened on Tuesday, August IS, with statements of hope and 
confidence exprersed by both sides, feelings scarcely supported by the facts 
of the situation, especially when expressed by the Kennedy contingent. Actual-
ly, the first day was devoted to settling technical differences in the sections 
dealing with the rirhts of individual union members with resoect to union dis-
1 
cipline and the reporting requirements of unions and their officials. 
In the following days agreement was reached slowly, but steadily, on the 
first six titles of the seven in the bills. The product to that point was 
largely the Landrum-Griffin bill, although a few exerpts from the Senate bill 
were adopted and a few compromises reached. But none of the really crucial 
issues had as yet been touched, and Kennedy was building a record of slow, 
reasonable concession, hoping that by yielding patiently on the smaller issues 
he could exact greater concessions based on preponderance in the record of his 
surrenders. This strategy was of dubious value in the situation, although the 
1 
~ ~ Times, August 19, 1959, section 1, p. 17. 
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only one tp-Qsible under the circumstances. For one thing, a repetition ot 
surrenders may induce belief in an opponent that the yielder is weak and 
atraid; and secondly, Kennedy at this point was without the support in the 
Senate needed to stymie the conte renee and still deteat the Landrum-Griffin 
bill in the Senate. Kennedy apparently knew that should the Landrum-Griffin 
bill go back to the Senate, it would be adopted as is. This was Majority 
2 Leader Johnson's view. So he could only beggar such compromises as the 
Landrum-Griftin forces could be persuaded to pg,rt with. Those turned out, pre 
dictably, to be meager. Kennedy, building his conciliator,y record for the big 
battle, claimed jn the Senate on August 28 that he had already compromised 
twenty-seven or twenty-eight times to the Landrum-Griffin supporters' three 
times. He admitted that he did not expect a deadlock but that he might be 
3 forced to disown the resulting bill. 
One noteworthy agreem6nt reached in these early debates in conference 
was the agreement to require all union officers to be bonded. This was oointed 
at the Teamsters, who were known to have had some of their officers refused 
bonds by surety companies.4 The Teamsters subsequently cancelled all bonds on 
their officers and took their business to tloyds of London. 'rhe bonding re-
quirement in the conference agreement required the bonds to be issued by 
surety companies holding grants ot authority from the Secretary of the Treasu 
thereby excluding Lloyds, though some foreign companies do hold such grants. S 
2New ~ Times, August 23, 1959, section 1, F. 46. 
3Ibid• 
4Ibid • 
5Ibid. 
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On :']onday, August 24, the conferees \>.'aded into the controversial issues 
involved in the bills, and they quickly mired there. They first considered 
the "no man's land!f dispute, realized they were far from agreement there, and 
then went on to provisions dealing with orga.nizational picketing, hot-cargo, 
and secondary boycotts. They were able to rea.ch agreer.'l.snt on one so-called 
"sweetenerJ' for labor in the Kennedy-Ervin bill, and that pennitted workers 
on strike to vote in recognition elections called by employers or new em-
ployees hired as replacements. But even t.hat was B. compromise, 8.S the Landrum .... 
Griffin proponents exacted a stipulation that the election rnust take place 
6 
within nine months for the strikers to be eligible to vote. 
Two smaller points ware won by the Landrum-Griffin propenents: one to keep 
service assistants (operators at telephone com~n1ss, u~ually) in the super-
visor class exempt under the Taft-Hartley Act from organization as wo~kers; 
and two, to deny authority to the NLRE to recognize a union prior to a. prt'l-
liminary W~qB hearing. 
The conferees then deadlocked in debate over jurisdiction in disputes ex-
cluded by the NLR8 trom its consideration. The Kennedy forces favored the 
state agencies, specifically excluding state courts, with all actions governed 
by Federal law. The LandI-am-Griftin bill provided for state courts juris-
diction as well, and allowed state law to be applied. At issue, basically, 
was the anti-labor reputation ot the courts and state laws in the South. The 
conferees made no headway in this dispute. 
On Monday, August 24, at the end ot the day, Senator Goldwater was dis-
eouraged enough to announce that he would ask the Senate to instruct the 
6 Chicaeo Sun-Times, August 26, 1959, pt. 1, p. 6. 
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Senate conferees if agreement had not been reached by 5:00 p.m. Wednesday, 
August 26. If he did so" it. ap,eared lik'3ly that the Senate would proceed 
7 to vote on the Landrum-Griffin bill as it passed the House, rather than in-
struct the:lr conferees to surrender in negotlations. 
Compromises. But on Tuesday" August 25, the conferees made more progress, 
and Goldwater retracted his earlier ?laced deadline, following a lengthy con-
S 
versation with Kennedy, Dirksen and Lyndon Johnson. The big news ot the day 
was a proposal ot compromise oftered by the tour Senate Democratic conferees. 
It covered the disputed areas of secondary boycotts" organizational picketing 
and recognition picketing, and no-mants land jurisdiction. The terms nf the 
package proposal were not made public, but press reports stated that they 
were mown to be couched in the language of the Landrum-Griffin bill with cer-
tain "refinements, limitations, and provisos.n9 One of the limitations 
placed by the Democrats in accepting the Landrum.Griffin position on no-man's 
land, that the state courts applying state law could handle cases excluded 
trom NLRB coverage, was that the area of current jurisdiction of the NLRB 
would be frozen SO that the NLRB would not in the future exclude any types of 
cases other than those at present excluded. 
The principal incident of the day occurred when Archibald Cox, Kennedy's 
assistant and the chief writer of the Kennedy-Ervin bill, appeared at the con-
ference to deliver a critique of the Landrum-Griffin bill. Cox pointed out 
7 Ibid., p. 6. 
e Ibid., p. 12. 
9~ York Times. AU~lst 26, 1959, article by Loftus, section 1, p. 21. 
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that the hot-careo provi3ions would invalidate certain industry-'\nete :?gree-
ments ;:;,.lreg,dy sie:ned" ,dth ·"fhich :na.na{:sLEmt and labor seemed to be r;:utually 
pleased. Cox cited the coa.:;" and r;:ilrQad industries as eXB.i'l,les of the E'!xist-
ence of b1)ch agreements. Cox also testified that tb~~ garment 'Worke.rs i"ould 
be handicapped by the seccmdar; boycott rC3strictions in the T..andrt:m-Criffin 
bill. His testimony irritated La.l1dru.ID to t:,C point that h~ disrluteu Cox's 
interpretations ;lnd demanded to know what business he had a,t tenc1ing ~~ 
10 
conference sessions. But the sum of the d:3.yt 9 d eliberaM.ons shcn'ied 
definite procress via the roqd of Kennedy-Ervin bill comproT'lis0 toward agree-
ment. 
Newspaper headlines Wednesday evening, August 26, proclaimed the con-
ference committee progress, :'Conferecs Ne,sring l.l'lbor Bill Acoord." :;Jedn"!s-
day's consideration of the compromise package of the ,four 5en<\t.'7: Dr,,:-:-,ocrlltic 
conferees brought a considera.ble area of u€,reement. 'T'entative agrecrr',er.t was 
reachee on the no-man's land com~ro~iee already mentioned; thp. conferees 
ag;reed, also, to eliminate the Ta.tt-Hartl~y Act runendmr:mt " .. hich would ha,ve 
legalized pre-hiring agreements in the oonstructio:1 industry, a provision 
Kennedy ha.d supported as vital to collective '-).'3.rgaining in the construction 
industry, where short 1';~rk projects make agreements d:lfficult to r~ach during 
11 
the term of 'Work. But thie ... ras not the fir:1s'1 of ::, .. ~,<:dy' 9 hopes tor such 
an amendment. 
Senator Goldwater presented a verJ delicate proposal to cover the Kennedy 
propOS3.ls regarding a more L'Ilportant Taft-Hartley a.m.endrnent affecting the con 
struction industry; the amendmont to permit common-sites picketing, i.e., 
lOChlcago Sun-Times, August 26, 1959, pt. 1, p. 12. 
11 2 s 
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picketing unfair pra.ctices of a contractor onerating at 3 vari~ty of r:dtes# 
although such picketing would affect sub-contractors who ''''~)'''e not n.:'lrties to 
the dispute, in violation of Taft-Hartley secondary' hoycott 'Prohibitions. 
nold'dater extended this nronosal to cover tht'l garment indust~,. workers' !)res-
sure for an amendment covering somewhat sil'l.ilRr drCUID!:ltances in th(~ garrrV'mt 
industry to those ,,{hich nrewdled in the construction indu"tr:r. GoJ.dtw.ter 
wanted to immunize the construction workers from the Ta.ft-Hartley nroh1bition 
against secondary boycotts by agreement in conference but not b~r ingerting rm 
amendment; this procedure would be recognized by the court!'! as le~i.fll"ct:tve 
history, according to Goldwater. The day ended with Democrats ~till pressing 
12 for amendments to cover the~e noints. 
Other matter considered durinp.: the day were Kennedy's com1":romise offer 
on organizational picketing whereby unions could picket, ~ploye)"'s until an 
NLRB election was held; and Kennedy forces pronosals to etrenet,hen reY'lOrtine 
requirements on payments by employers to labor consultant!!. C-oldw"ter renf'!!r-
ally agreed to the Kennedy position on organizat:l.onal piekf'!!t.1.ng ann th~ eon-
ferees did strengthen the Landrum-Griffin rt!1'Ortinp; requiremel'lte on th~ second 
issue. On the two most controversial issues remaininf, those of rickettng ~.nd 
secondary boycotts, only part.s of the issues ~main('ltd in disput"!'. At the end 
of the day, Goldwater characterized the product of the c~~ferees to that point 
as ·'ninety per cent Landrum-Griffin bill-ma.ybe more the.n that."l) 
On Thursday, August 27# prospects for a final bill took anoth~r turn for 
the worse as Kennedy stood fast in support. of amendments protecting the gar-
ment workers' and building trades' secondary boycott practices. 
12 
Ibid., p. 17. 
13 
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Two other issues also remained unsettled as of this day: how much 
advertising unions could do regarding ItW1fairlt goodo produced by a retaii..er, 
and how long a union should be a110wed to picket to organize a plant before a 
representation election is held. On these questions the Senate Democrats re-
tained the position stated in their compromise of two days before. 
A session scheduled for the following day, Friday, August 28, failed to 
settle the questions at issue, and the same day Dirksen and Kennedy appeared 
in the Senate to request that the Senate conferees be instructed regal-ding 
these issues. F..ach advanced a resolution asking that the Senate conferees 
recede and accept specified positions. As Senate rules require a one-day 
layover, the resolutions were laid over until Monday. 
f).Ml t\gr!!!!nt. The conferees met }'{onday and made certain adjustments 
in their positions on secondary boycotts and organizational picketing which 
Offered enough promise of eventual settlement to lead them to schedule Tuesday 
sessions, thus delaying floor discussion in the Senate on the resolutions to 
instruct the conferees. At this stage it seemed that reluctance to delay ad-
jOl.lrnment by another floor fight was as much a. factor in inducin~ further com-
promises as was the desire to enact a labor reform bill.14 During the day 
Senator Morse walked out, announcing he was 'through" ; 18.ter~ however, he pre-
15 
mieed to return Tuesday. Kennedy received some moral support from Secretary 
of Labor Mitchell, whose ~mn1nistration recommendations had included the 
Ker1nedy-s,onsored issue in the conference regarding special exemption from 
14 !z!X2I! Times, August 31, section I, p. 1. 
15 Ibid., p. 12. 
r 
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secondary borcott provisions for the construction trades. On Tuesday, no 
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votes were taken on the key issues, but the conferees neared agreement on 
language to be used in the amendment covering picketing after the labor com-
mittee statfs had worked all Monday night drafting new phrasing. The statts 
were assigned to work Tuesday night on the same project. The conterees 
streamed in a.nd out of the Conference to discuss the latest proposals with the 
labor and management. lobbyists who crowded the corridors .17 
The conferees finally reached on Wednesday, September 2, 1959, a not al-
together hapPY' agreement on the final language ot the labor reform. bill. Sena.-
tor W&11le Morse announced he would not sign. the conterence report; Representa-
tive Carl Perkins wanted mere time to study it. 
The final result resembled for the most part the Landrum-Griffin bill, al-
though Kennedy termed it a "vast improvement over the House-passed bill.plS 
The gist ot the t1nal agreem.ent.s over the most disputed issues was t 
a. As to secondary boycotts, all hot-ca.rgo contracts were decla.red illegal 
with the exception ot certa.in garment industry practices; picketing at 
primary sites only was permit.ted, not at common sites, as sought by 
19 Kennedy and the building trades. 
b. Organizational picketing was banned tor twelve months following a union 
representation election, or when another union had been certitied to repre 
sent em:pilioyees; no picketing was permitted more than thirty days prior to 
an election; picketing for information could not aftect deliveries or 
16 Ibid., p. 12. 
l7Chicago Tribune, September 2, 1959, pt. 1, p. 13. 
lS!!!! York Times. 
19 ~ 
section 1, p. 1. 
r 
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service. F..nforoement was authorized through mandatoq injunction throue.b the 
NLRB, but the House provision for damage suits was eliminated. 
The proposed exemption for the building trades unions was eliminated 
after the conference was advised that the House Parliamentarian would rule it 
out if a point of order was raised against it. The point of order could be 
raised in this circumstance since the provision had been part of neither bill 
as it passed its respective house. Kennedy' announced that Senate leaders had 
agreed to exnedite in the next session of Congress 8 law protecting construc-
tion-site picketing. The pro-union lobbyists regarded Johnson and Rayburn as 
responsible for wrecking the common-site amendment hopes, mainly through the 
20 point-of-order opinion • 
... Co ... n_f..,e;;;;.;re...,n ... c... e !!ll1.!n Senate. The bill was taken immediately to the noor 
of the Senate where the leadership scheduled it for debate early Thursday. 
The question arose almost immediately as to what name the bl1l should now 
carry. Kennedy stated that it should be called "The Labor4fanagement Rtdorm 
21 
Bill" as it was neither the Kennedy-Ervin bill nor the Landrum-Griffin bill. 
In a press statement issued by Landrum and Griffin, however, they stated that 
the bill is " ••• basically the Landrum-Griftin bill with a few clarifying amend 
22 . 
ments." This statement is substantially true, though the compromises ex-
tracted by Kennedy and the other pro-Kennedy bill conferees were really more 
than clarifying amendments. 
On Wednesday" when the bill was returned to the Senate noor, Kennedy' 
20 ~!2I!s. Times, September 3, 1959, artiele by Loftus, section 1, p. 13. 
21Chicago Tribune" September 3" 1959" pt. 1, p. 18. 
22Ibid• 
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submitted the Report of the Conference Committee. Barden submitted his re-
port to the House on the following day. McClellan added an interesting obser-
vation in the Senate, th~t he regarded the Bill of Rights in the Kennedy-Ervin 
bill as superior to the one that emerged in the Conference bill. The Senate 
discussion on the bill was largely a round of compliments with a few cynical 
expressions regarding the failure of similar provisions in the House in the 
previous year's Kennedy-Ives bill. The vote on the conference report came 
quickly, and as might now be expeeted, was overwhelmingly in favor of it, b)" 
a vote of ninety-five to two, with only Morse and Langer opposed. Senators 
Case, Church, and OtMahoney (Dem.Wyo.) did not vote. A motion to reconsider 
was laid on the table, and 80 ended the Senate consideration ot labor reform 
legislation in the First Session of the Eighty-8ixth Congress. 
Conference B1ll Ja House. In the House, Barden called up the report for 
consideration on Friday, September 4, and asked unanimous consent that the 
statement of the managers be read instead of the whole report. His requ~st. 
was approved and the clerk read the statement. 
A few members of the House spoke against the bill, actually explaining wh7 
they intended to vote against it, but everyone was tired of the charges and 
counter-charges and after Wier (Dem.Minn.), Shelle,y (Oem.Calif.), Dent (Dem.Pa. , 
Libonati (Dem.nl.) and Vanik (Dent.Ohio) condemned it, Barden called for a vote 
on the bill. There were 352 yeas and 52 nays, one (~lor, Rep. Pa.) voting 
present, and thirty not voting. A motion to consider the vote was laid on the 
table, and so ended the labor reform battle in the House of Representatives. 
r 
CHAPTER VI 
LOBBYING 
Because ot the unusually strong demonstration ot lobbying pref,sures during 
the congressional consideration of the labor retorm legislation, it seems im-
perative to devote this ohapter exclusively to some ot the tacts revealed con-
cerning this activity_ The general consensus ot congressmen and Washington 
observers was that the lobbying activity on this issue in this session of Con-
gress tar exceeded any like activities in previous controversial legislative 
battles in their recollection. 
Lobbying, of course, is nothing new to the \<Jashlngton scene, and indeed, 
reports of the earliest congressional sessions carried with them accounts ot 
special interests striving for advantage in legislation. Early House of Repre-
sentative rules excluded lobbyists from floor seats, a reflection on how far 
lobbying had gone at that time. But only in recent decades, especially since 
World War II, has lobbying become a continuous and significant professional 
acth1ty. Every important industry and activity maintains some form of repre-
sentation in Washington. 
Histor,y .2! Lobbying. It was not until the 19.30' 8 that any etfort was made 
to formally regulate lobbying activity_ The first inclusive act affecting 
lobbying was enacted in 1946--the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act--as Title 
f:I:J 
r 
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II of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.1 Under this Act repre-
sentatives of special interests were required to register and make public 
their expenditures in lobbJ~ng activity. But under a Supreme Court inter-
pretation:of the Act in 1954, only those who solicit funds where a principal 
purpose is to communicate directly with oongressmen to influence legislation, 
need register and file reports thereunder. It is estimated that fewer than 
half of the lobbyists in Hashington register and file reports; the others 
can claim if challenged that their principal purpose in \vashington is legal 
practice, or eduoation, or that money spent for influencing legislation is 
not necessarily money solicited for that purpose. So the current Federal 
regulation of lobbying cannot be considered to have appreciably diminished 
or rendered ineffective those harmful effects of pressure groups the laws 
were passed ostensibly to control. 
Lobbying activity in matters ooncerning labor-management relations 
has been especially intense, since la~~ in this field have such tremendous 
impact on labor and management interests. One of the most successful lobby-
ing ventures is attributed to ~wo lawyers named Morgan and Iseman who, repre 
santing business interests, reportedly drafted the Taft-Hartley law of 1947.2 
And so with the advent of another important legislative proposal, this 
one with the inviting or dire-depending on the point of view-intention of 
reforming the labor organizations, was certain to elicit the very best lobby 
ing efforts of interested parties. 
~uel Celler, "Pressure Grouns in Congress, II Th.! Annals of the 
American AcadeffiY 2! Political ~ Social Science, Vol. 3r-rSept~mber-1958),5. 
2 ~ York Times. August 16, 1959, article by Josoph Loftus, section 4, 
• 8. 
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Since lobbying efforts accompanied every step of the bill, and d'fected 
every member of the Congress, it is impossible within the limits o~ this the-
sis to attempt an exhaust.ive exa.mination of all the reported instances. But 
let us examine the most note'worthy examples of lobby pressure--those efforts 
which were reportedly of some influence in consideration of the labor refonn 
',bUl. 
Zagri and ~ Teamsters. By far the most outstanding and well~advertised 
activity was that PUt forth by the lobbyists of the Teamsters Un:l.on, l~d by 
Sidney Zagri. Zagri is an attorney and a graduate of the Univ~rsity of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles, Harvard and the University of Wisconsin;3 he set out 
on an ambitious program worthy of his background. 
Zagri" quiet during the progress of the Kennedy-Ervin bill in the Senate, 
burst into bloom as the bill reached the House in May_ 7~gri and Harold J. 
Gibbons, Teamster International vice-president, played host at a series of 
breakfasts at the Congressional Hotel in \-iashington, to which were invited 
4 
all 435 members of the House, about two dozen at a time. Zagri would wire 
Teamster local officers instructing them to wire, in turn, the breakr.~st in-
vitations to the congressmen in their districts. These local union officials 
would usually be on hand themselves to apply additional pressure. At these 
breakfasts Zagri explained the labor (Teamster) position of the reform pro-
posa1s pending" and in subsequent conversation concentrated on the House 
Labor COII'.mi.ttee's thirty members. 5 Through information gained during theF.fe 
3:llm!" LXXIV (.July 27, 1959), 13. 
4Ibid• ~nd Newsweek. LIV (May 18, 1959), 31. 
5Time, P. 13. 
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contacts, Zagri set up a notebook rating for each congressman, A to G, de-
pending on the degree 'of like~dedness with the Teamster position found in 
the man. 
Zagri took a great deal of interest in the House Committee deliberations 
on the labor bill. When a ten-man group of Democrats voted against a union-
sponsored plan to bury the bill in committee, Zagri learned their identities 
and telegraphed Teamster officials in their home districts urging protests. 
He even provided form letters and helped plan protest meetings, bringing 
6 Teamsters to Washington for that purpose. Zagri personally offered fifty-
nine pages of amendments before the Committee and took an entire day in tes-
timony in the hearings held by the Committee. 
But his activities went beyond the fine line between persuasion and in-
sistence, and many congressmen were more than annoyed at him. Rep. Udall 
(Dem.Ariz.) excoriated him bitterly for his interference in telling Udall's 
constituents that he had Itvoted wrongtt; 7 Mrs. Green (Dero.Ore.) said, nHe can 
go to hell. II ;8 and Rayburn charged Zagri with lying in stating that Rayburn 
supported the Shelley bill.9 Rep. Barden threatened to bring an investigatio 
10 
of his "brazen outside influence." 
An incident tor which Zagri may not have been responsible had a worse 
effect than all the others; Zagri had been pressuring Rep. Frank Thompson 
6 Ibid., p. 13. 
7Ibid., p. 13. 
a 1!!!, XLVII (July 27, 1959), 30. 
n ;~ .!2!!s. Times, Au,gust 16, 1959, sectton 4, p. s. 
lOIbi::!. 
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(Dem..N.J.), a friend of labor, to work for less stringent legislation than 
the moderate reform Thomuson Has advocating, and Zagri denounced Thompson for 
failing to fall in line. After this falling out, Thompson began reoeiving 
threatening phone callsj a typical one of which ~aid,HYoulre anti-labor ann 
wetzoe going to fix you. ltll Thompson reported the calls to the FIJI and the 
following week, on August lS, 1959, an unidentified person ran up to his car 
at a stop light and squirted acid on him. Only bad aim saved Thompson from 
injur,y, and the public indignation occasioned by this incident as it was re-
ported in the press nationwide boded ill for Zagrils efforts to influence the 
congressmen to ~odify strict labor reform. 
A likely side-effect of the lobbying act~ivity on the labor reform laws 
in the First Session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress may be the early passage of 
legislation providing for criminal penalties for the sending of false or 
fictitious communioations to congressmen. This proposal has already been in-
cluded in bills introduced in 1959 which will carry over to the Second Session 
in 1960. 
Hoffa Acts. Zagrits employer, James Hoffa, had kept himself out of the 
fight over the labor reform bill, with one exception which will be mentioned 
a little later, perhaps realizing that his public opposition might, be all that 
such a proposal might need in order to succeed. But after the Kennedy-Ervin 
bill went to the House Hoffa. changed his mind. In an appearance on a. network 
television program on July 26, the agenda of which had previously been dis-
cussed with Hoffa, the leader of the Teamsters Union openly expressed his 
,114.~f~1 XLVII (July 27, 1959) 30. 
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opposition to the Kermedy-7;rvin bill, ter!l1inf~ it "not corrective, but 
i "'j ,,12 pun v.ve. A.nd having gone thiOl.t r~~.r, Hoffa did not hesitate to show his 
union'" intention to fieht F.l1 th~ flaY. Hoffa anno1IDced tha.t he was setting 
up a separs.te depart,lent in national union heedquarters in ~';a8hington to tell 
his 1,500,,000 teamsters about the vot.:.inr; records of congressmen. He of course 
denied thf.t this was an nttompt to frighten the conr.;ressmen during their con-
sideration of the la:Llor reform bill.13 
Again, after approval of the Landrum-Griffin bill in tl~ House, Hoffa 
publicly states. his opposition to tW.s type of legislation. He pointed out, 
however, that the bill would hurt the Teamsters hardly a.t all, and that his 
opposition wa.s based. on his concern for the ubor movement in general.14 This 
Bort of qualified opposition was obviot'.sly designed to infiuenoe those who were 
supporting the bill because of their determination to do away l>:ith "Hoffaism." 
Zagri followed up on this tactic the following week, going into detail in 
examination of the bill to demonstrate hO'VI the Landru.m-Griffin bill would hurt 
most union!: other than his own by: 
a. forcing Teamster drivers to cross picket lines, thereby making it a~nost 
impossible tor smaller unions to win strikes; 
b. forcing these smaller unions to join powerful organizations like the 
Teamsters; 
c. imposing financial reporting requirements which would also induce smaller 
unions to a.ffiUate with la.rger organizations whose statf's are well 
l2Chica,go Trigune, July 27, 1959, pt. :i, p. 12. 
13Tbid~ 
l4~ew York Times. August 19, 1959, section 1, p. 16. 
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equipped to handle complica.ted accounting and reporting requirements J and 
inducing unions to circumvent secondary boycott prohibitions by amalgamat-
ing into larger organizations to secure master nationwide contracts and 
allow general strikes.15 
This latter analysis had all the earmarks of plausability and candor, 
but coming from Teamster sources, could not at this point ha.ve exercised much 
persuasive power. No one who could remember the famous Hoffa speech to a long-
sho~~ convention in Brownsville, Texas on May 19, 1959, was likely to be-
lieve that Hoffa's union was soberly considering the good of the nation and 
the labor movement. In that speech Hoffa responded to the talk about closing 
the secondary boycott loopholes in the Taft-Hartley act by declaring that 
"they talk about secondary boycott. ille can call a primary strike all across 
the nation that will straighten out the employers once and for all.,,16 Typical 
of the reaction this statement evoked was Senator McClellan's observation that 
it was·the most arrogant, brazen thing I've heard in ~ 1ife."17 
CareY Lgbbz±ni Eifort.. But it was not anyone associated with the 
Teamsters that committed the biggest tactical faux pas of the lobbying efforts. 
That distinction must be assigned to James B. Carey, president ot the Inter-
national Union of Electrical Workers, and vice-president of the AFL-CIO. 
Carey, incensed at the passage of the Lan~riffin bill in the House, sent 
complimentary letters to the 17 Republicans and 184 Democrats who had voted 
15 Chicago Sun-Times. August 25, 1959, pt. 1, p. 8. 
16 Newsweek, XLIU (June 1, 1959), 21. 
17 Ibid. 
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for the bill. In this latter letter, Carey warned these congressmen that his 
union would do everything in its power to convince workers in their districts 
18 
that they were anti-l~bor and should be defeated. 
Many congressmen, friends of labor included, were indignant and several 
expressed their outrage at this "threat" and rtattempt to ~oerce the Congress." 
Carey appeared to be genuinely slrrprised at this reaction and denied that he 
had intended his letter as a threat. But within a week Car~y committed another 
lobbying error in his reply to Rep. Ayres (Rep. Ohio) , who had publicly accused 
Carey of "Hofr~-like" tactics in sending his letters.19 In his letter Carey 
called Ayres a "mouthpiece" and "tool" of the National Association of Manu-
facturers. 20 
Though he may not have intended it, Carey by implication included in his 
intemperate accusation all the other oongressmen who had voted for the Landrum-
Griffin bill. Carey's actions must have been a source of great embarrassment 
to the Committee on Political Education (COPE) of the AFL-CIO which was 
supposed to provide the lead to the international unions in analyzing the im-
portance ot voting records on specific issues. 
Labor Lobbf. ,other ,~pl.,s of labor's lobbying tactics whioh backfired 
included the threat by & bakers' union representative to Rep. John Lindsay 
(Rep.N.Y.) that the union would "work you over in 1960," causing him to change 
." 
a nay vote to yea on the Landrwn-Griftin bl11f-- and th. remark attributed to 
18New York Times, August 20, 1959, section 1, p. 11. 
19--
Chicaao Sun-Times. August 26, 1959, pt. 1, p. 12. 
2OIbid• 
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Hoffa that he would elect a Congress to enact proper legislation on labor' 
matters, which statement cattSed Democrat Clarence Cannon of Hissouri to switch 
to support, of the Landrum...(j.riffin bill.22 
The labor lobby realized after their defeat on the labor legislation 
that they had made many mistakes. One hundred of the lobbyists of the AFL-GrO 
met at Federation headquarters following that defeat to analyze its causes, but 
could not come to ~ conclusion. Based on their discussion, however, Bus!nes8 
Week magazine gauged the causes to be the following: 
a. The unions failed to assess public reaction to the issue of racketeering; 
b. The unions were over-optimistic about the outcome of the battleJ 
c. The union leaders failed to grasp subtleties in the legislation; 
d. They used threats rather than persuasion; and 
e. They sowed contusion in not defining a clear-cut position, particularly in 
stating opposition to provisions they were actuall1 prepared to accept as 
compromises.23 
Management Lobbf. Lobbying on behalt of management organizations was 
eTery bit as intensive as that conduoted by labor groups, but was somewhat more 
sophisticated, and considerably more successful, it judged by the results and 
the tact that no congressman expressed indignation or affront as a result of 
management lobbying pressures. Bernard D. Nossiter, writing in the i'lashington 
Post ot September 11, 1959, analyzed the principal tactic or the management 
group as tollows: 
The National Association of Manufacturers, American Farm Bureau Federatio', 
22Ibid., p. 12. 
23August 22, p. 83. 
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United St~tes Ch~~ber of Com~erce (and its state groups), and the less well 
known National Small Business Men's Association collaborated in a maneuver to 
influence moderate congressmen from districts which elected them b,rless than 
55 per cent of the total vote. There were some 120 of these, fifty-four of 
whom were selected for special attention, meetings, letter-writing and various 
forms of contact to give them the idea that a key percentage of their consti-
tuents were interested in strong labor reform. Left alone, these fifty-four 
would probably have voted for the moderate bill which available information 
indicated they preferred. But in the crucial vote which approved the Landrum-
Griffin 229-201 in the most important House vote, no less than twenty-three 
voted for the bill, more than the fourteen who would have been (ufficient to 
24 
change the tide. But this was achieved only after a most care1'ul and effec-
tive campaign of gentle but insistent persu·~.:don, aided inadvertently (1) by 
the July $, 1959 re-run of a television program on strong-arm labor tactics 
in the jukebox industry. The program, Armstrong Cork Company's "Circle 
Theater," was selected by the lobbyists for "plugging," i.e., promoting, and 
this they did by advertising it to employers and employees around the country, 
arranging for its showing in areas where it was not alread7 tied in with the 
network, taking advertisements in newspapers announcing the time and station 
'and urging viewers first to watch, then to write their congressmen, and mail-
ing out sc;ne five million pieces of mail concerning the show. Conveniently 
enough, the show concluded with a tape of Senator McClellan urging viewers to 
do eanething about the conditions revealed in the drama. 
2~uoted in £n, (September 11, 1959), 17492. 
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Though the show wa.s the vehl.cle around lmich the managel"..lent lobby built 
much of its strategy for a. few weeks, it did come a little too early to have 
maximum effect. It may be considered as a softener for what followed that 
muoh easier. Vlhen Landrum and Griffin introduced their bill later in the month 
of July, the lob~ went to work again over the television circuits, this time 
with tapes of Landrum and Griffin pleading with viewers to write their con-
greBsmen in support of the strict labor reforms. The great volume of mail re-
ported by' the congressmen at this time must in some appreciable degree be re-
garded as a result of management's lobbying efforts. 
There is little question but that the ~gement lobby showed itself to 
be better organized, better coordinated, more subtle and generally more effec-
tive than that of labor. 
CHAPTER VII 
PRESIDF,NTIAL ACTION AND A SUMMARY 
\'Vhen the bill cleared Congress and was sent to the Nhite House on Sep-
tember 4 for the presidential signature which would make it the law of the 
nation, the chief exeoutive was in Scotland, visiting Prime Hinister ~{acMillan 
and Her Highness Queen Elizabeth. There was no concern about the President's 
a.ttitude toward the bill, however, as his a.dvoca.cy of strong labor reforms 
was well-mown in Congress and e18ewhere, and his opinions had been expressed 
throughout the conflict by Secretar;y Mitchell, Senator Dirksen, Representative 
Halleck, and others. On August 13, when victory for the Landrum-Griftin bill 
was assured, he issued from the temporary White House at Gettysburg, Pa.., the 
following statement: "With, I am sure, millions of Americans, I appla.ud the 
House of Representatives for its vote today in support of the Landrum-Griffin 
labor reform bill which would deal effectively with the abuses disclosed by 
the McClellan Committee. I congratulate all those who voted in support of 
this legislation ••• 1 President Eisenhower's signature on the bill on Sep-
tember 14, 1959 .. without comment, 'WaS an anti-cl1ma..x to the fierce legislative 
battle that had concluded several days before. But it represented for Eisen-
hower a victor;y he could leave with his party to use in claiming for his Re-
publlcan administration vigorous and responsive leadership of Congress in 
1!!!!2£l Times. August 14 .. 1959, section 1, p. S. 
71 
r 
L 
72 
issues vital to the nation. And, in truth, the tinal summary of how the labor 
bill became law must include the fact that the President·s appeal on tele-
vision on August 6 for enactment of legislation of the kind found in the 
Landrum-Griftin bill marked a definite turning point in favor of the strict 
reform bill. It is a question, though, whether his was the leadership here. 
Both Dirksen and Halleck stated during the debate that they had urged the 
President to make such an address, and evidently the idea was not only not his 
own, but needed considerable urgLnc on him before he consented. 
Sy.mmar.t 2!. !l:!!. Law. A summary is now in order of the most important pro-
visions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as the 
bill is now known,2 
Title I. The Bill of Rights guarantees union members the right to nomi-
nate candidates, participate in meetings with other members, and vote for 
union officers; it prohibits unions from preventing suits by members after 
union procedures are exhausted for settlement of members' grievances; protects 
the right of members to appear in governmental proceedings; prohibits the 
union from increasing assesa~ents of members except by a secret majority vote; 
requires that members be furnished copies by the union of collective bargain-
ing agreements and that the members .be informed about the labor bill; requires 
that unions give ~~tten statements of charges to members in disciplining 
actions, and provide membere with a fair hearing; and permits civil suits by 
members for infringement of rights guaranteed by the bill. 
Title lI. The Reporting Requirements section requires unions to submit 
reports to the Secretary of Labor on their constitutions and by-laws, annual 
2U. S. Congress, Public Law 86-257, Eighty-8txth Congress, (September 14, 
-
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financial reports including a record of loans of more than two hundred and 
fifty dollars per person, records of all disbursements, and requires that this 
information be available to union members; provides for suits by members for 
court permission to view such records; requires reports of possible confiicts 
of interest; requires employers to file annual reports wi th th'~ Secretary of 
Labor on non-wage money paid to unions or to their representatives or to 
labor relations consultants tor influencing employees on bargaining rights; 
and requires labor relations consultants (but not lawyers) to file sLular 
reports. This title also makes it a crime to fail to tile or to falsify or 
destroy- such reports. 
T1tle.m. This section on Trusteeships requires that semi-annual re-
ports be filed with the Secretary of Labor by unions which hold other unions 
in trusteeship, detailing the conditions of the trusteeship and the financial 
condition of the local union so held; makes it a crime not to do so or to fal-
si.fy' such reports; permits suits by the Secretary of Labor or by unions to 
prevent violation of trusteeship requirements; provides in such suits that 
trusteeship would be undisturbed for eighteen months, but a.fter that time it 
would be presumed invaUd unless extended by court order • 
.. Ti..,t ... l ... e.!I.. This section on Elections requires secret-ballot votes in the 
election of union officers at least every- three years for locals, four years 
for intermediate unions and five years for nattonal o~nizations; requires 
the union to mail the candidates' campaign literature to the members at the 
candidates' own expense; provides that where there is a union shop, candidates 
may inspect the membership Hsts; candidates may observe the counting of 
ballots and the voting »rocedure; requires that members be g1 van the oppor-
tunity to nominate; permits the Seereta17 of Labor to conduct an election to 
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recall a union ofticer guilty of ~isconduct; permits union members to seek 
injunctions through the Seoretary of Labor if their claims of violation at 
election and recall procedures are not decided by union proced11rss within 
three months. 
Title 1. The section Safeguards for Labor Organizations requires union 
officers required to handle money to do so solely for the benefit of the union 
and its members; pennits members to sue for damages and to ask accounting when 
an officer is alleged to have violated this requirement and the union had 
made no attempt to recover; makes it a oriminal aot to embezzle union funds, 
or for a union officer handling money not to be bonded; p.l..")hibits loans of 
more than two thousand dollars to any officer or employee, and prohibits the 
paying of fines by the union for violations of the bill; bars officers from 
oftice for five years tor convictions of felonies on the reporting or trustee-
ship requirements of the bUl; bars trom office Communist party members; re-
peals the requirement that union offioers file non-Communist affidavits in 
order to have the union eligible for the services of the National Labor Re-
lations Board. 
Title II. The section titled Miscellaneous Provisions provides penalties 
of one thousand dollars and one year in prison for use or threat of violence 
to interfere with the rights guaranteed in Title I. This section also pro-
hibits extortion picke~ing; gives the Secretary of Labor power to investigate 
all violations of the bill with the exception of the Bill of Rights and the 
Tatt-Hartley amendments; prohibits unions from disciplining their members for 
using their rights under the bill; provides that the Railway Labor Act. shall 
not be affected by the provisions of the bill; provides that state laws on 
crimes covered in the bill shall not be diminished in authority. 
l 
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Title VII: The title called Amen~ents to the Taft-Hartley Act provides 
that state agencies and the courts B.re permitted to assun~ jurisdiction over 
labor disputes excluded from consideration by the NI,R,B; bals the NLRB from 
enlarging areas it declines to consider; permits the President to desi~~te 
an acting NLRB General Counsel if the office is va.cant; r.:m.kes jt an unfair 
labor DTactice to coerce employers to approve a union or to obtain hot-cargo 
contract, to coerce him to recognize unions or to force another employer to 
recognize n union not certified by the NLRB in an election; to force him to 
stop doing business with another firm. This title also ~dkes it an unfair 
labor practice to force workers to strike or refuse to ha.!ldle goods for any 
of the purposes mentioned abo·.re. Exempting only the garment industry and the 
building industry under certain sJ>8cified conditions, hot-cargo contracts are 
considered unfair labor practice. 
Title VIr also prohibits organizational and recognition picketing if the 
employer has not been guilty of an unfair labor practice and has recognized 
another union under an NLRB certification election within the previous year, 
or if the union had been picketing tor thirty days ird thout asldngtor an 
election. It brings railroad, airline, farm, and local govemment workers 
under the Taft-Hartley law provisions regarding picketing and secondary boy-
cott; permits the NLRB to allow economic strikers to vote in representation 
elections conducted within a year of the strike's beginning; it permits pre-
hire contracts in the building industry even if no NLRB election has taken 
place, and a.llows these contracts to require l"orkers to join the union within 
seven days and except where outlawed by state law it allows these contracts 
to require hirin[ through the union. 
l 
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!!2! ~ Kennedy-Ervin? How much of this is derived from the original 
Kennedy-Ervin bill is difficult to assess. Many of the bills and advocates of 
reform legislation sponsored similar provisions the differences among which 
defy the analy'sis of all but experienced labor law authon ties. One or more 
of them may be the basis from which final provisions were taken. 
Title I of the final bill was not present in the original Kenned;r-Errln 
bill; Title II in Kennedy-Ervin exempted about 70 per cent of the local. unions 
from its requirements; Title III and Title IV', not very important or contro-
versial, are roughl1 similar in eftect as they were in the original Kennedy-
Ervin bill; Title V in the final bill established fiduciary and bonding re-
quirements which were not included in the original Kennedy-Ervin bill-the 
latter had a most vague voluntary code of ethical practices at this point; 
'l'itle VI, miscellaneous provisions in the fkl1.<'ll, was merely definitions in the 
Kennedy-Ervin bill; Title VII, the real punch in the final, ran roughshod over 
the original Kennedy-Ervin bill, which merely had a build1~ industry pre-hire 
amendment to Taft-Hartley as its backbone. It may fairly' be said tha.t the 
Kenne~.Ervin bill was wounded in the Senate, mortally wounded in the House, 
and died a lingerirtg death in conference committee. 
Based on the story of the billls consideration, among countless possible 
reasons for or causes of the triumph of the strict version of labor reform 
over th~ moderate KennedyoooErvin ty-pe, the following emerge as the most signi-
ficant. and are listed roughly 1n the order of their estimated importance to 
the outcome; 
a. In the two and one-half years of Racket Committee Hearings, Senator 
McClellan's prestige and efforts on behalf of stricter labor reform; 
Hoffa's belligerent attitude throughout the hearings; and the public 
r 
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reaction to these two men and the unsavory testimony revealed during the 
hearings. 
b. President Eisenhower's intercession on behalf of stronger laber reform, 
especially his nationwide television address on August 6, 1959. In a 
speech to labor leaders in Wisconsin in October 1959 Kenne~ gave Eisen-
hower's efforts as the biggest reason for enactment of the strict reforms.' 
c. Senator Kenne~ts determination, because of his presidential aspirations, 
and regardless of obstacles, to get a bill. Goldwater called Kennedy "the 
key" to getting a bill.4 It is unlikely that the proponents of the moder-
at. labor reform provisions would have been successful in "moderating" the 
Lan~riffin bill at all had not Senator Kennedy possessed and exercised 
his great talent for timely compromise. 
d. The over-Dublicizing by the press of labor scandals, and editorial pres-
sure for strict reform. 
e. Senator's Goldwater's tireless and able efforts for strict reform. 
f. Finally, the pubUc attitude and pressure on congress as a result of the 
above reasons and the additional irritation produced by th~ interrelation-
ship among three factors: relatively high union wages, continuing infla-
tion, and the prolonged steel strike. 
Passage of strict labor reforms continues the reversal of the position of 
the Federal Government in labor-management relations. The cycle that saw the 
Federal Government evolve its position of early judicial restraint on 
'New ~ Times. October 25, 1959, Magazine Section, p. 17. 
~ew I2r!S. Time!, August 16, 1959, seotion 4, p. 1. 
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collective bargainin[; into e:ltp<'U1ding legisJ.ati-ve protection up to the time of 
the \';agnar Act of 1935 found a first step in the process of reversal with pas-
page of the Tatt.-Hart1ey amendment to the VJagner Act in 1947. and now finds a 
seoond step with this passage of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959. And this new direction, espeoially as evidenoed in the Federal 
extension of control over internal union affairs, may well find its ultimate 
expression it Congress should place union organizations under the oovera.ge of 
the anti-truat legislation. 
BIBLlOORAPHY 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
HemMs beton the Joint Bubcosmn1\tee ot th! c9J!!!!\ttee sa Education and 
Labor. House 2l. Representatives. fot;h Conq's!. 1n Se,!ion sm. L,bor-
!W'!¥ement Retot! LeSslation. Washington, 1959. 
Kennedy, John F. Ib!. Fac\s About the pd.y=E£!in Labor lUJJr.. Speech be-
tore the Senate ot the U. B., Was ngton, April 29, 1959. 
U. s. Congress. c0w,esSi9nal Record. 86th Congress, 1st Session, Volume 105, 
Washingt,on, 19 • 
U. B. Congress. Public L!! §6:2'7. 86th Congress, 1st Session, S. 1555. Wash-
ington, 1959. 
n. BECONDARY SOURCES 
Busines, Week. New York, 1958-1959. 
Celler, Emmanuel. "Pressure Groups in Conge,s," The ~ .2!. ,he American 
Ac§demr .2!. Po,i\ical ~ Social Science, Volume )lCJl[September 1958). 
Chicago Bun-Times. Chicago, 1959. 
Chicago TribYne. Chicago, 1958-1959. 
LUI. New York, 1959. 
Nev York Time,. New York, 1958-1959. 
New.week. New York, 1958-1959. 
Time. New York, 1958-1959. 
y. ~. !!!.!! And ~:ur1d Rewa. Washington, D.C., 1958-1959. 
79 
January 20 1 
Jan. 28 - Feb. 6 
Februa17 18 
March 4. 
April 11 
A.prU 16 
April 22 
April 25 
Ma,. 19 
June 10 
Jul;r 23 
Jul;r 26 
Jul;r 27 
Jul,. 30 
A.ugust 6 
APPENDU 
CHRONOLOGY 
Kennedy introduces bill in Senate (S. 1555). 
Senate Subcommittee on Labor holds hearings on 
labor reform. 
Senate Suboommittee approves Kennedy-Ervin bill. 
House Joint Subcommittee begins hearings on labor 
reform. 
Kennedy-Ervin bill reported out of committee to 
Senate by thirteen to two vote. 
Senate begins debate on Kennedy-Ervin bill. 
"Bills of Rights" amendment approved. 
Senate passes Kennedy-Ervin bill ninety to one. 
Hofta makes speech threatening nation-wide strike. 
House Subcommittee concludes hearings on labor 
reform bills. 
House Committee on Education and Labor votes bill 
out of committee sixteen to ten. 
Hoffa announces opposition to Kennedy-Ervin bill. 
Landrwn-Griff'in bUl introduced in House. 
House Committee on Education and Labor files report 
on labor reform bill. 
Second Interim Report of McClellan Rackets Committee 
released; Eisenhower makes television appeal for 
strong labor reform. 
• 
August 10 
August 11 
August 13 
August 14 
August 18 
Aug. 18 - Sept. 2 
August 2$ 
September 4 
Sept. ember 14 
a, $$ AQQ, ; $£(212$ 
Rayburn makes radio appeal tor moderate labor reform. 
House begins debate on labor retorm bills. 
House approves Landrum-Griftin amendment to Jl;$3.b. re-
torm bill voting 229-201. 
House approves Land~riffin bill aa ameDded by 
final vota. 
Rep. Thompson is victim of acid attack. 
Conference Committee is in session. 
Carey sends letter to House members. 
Oongress clears labor reform bill for presidential 
signature by' vote in Senate, 95-2, and House, 352 ... 52. 
President signs labor reform bill. 
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